LITHUANIAN RECOGNITION

ADVOCATED BY

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LITHUANIAN INFORMATION BUREAU
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MAP OF LITHUANIA AND THE BALTIC STATES

The map on the opposite page has been prepared by the Lithuanian Information Bureau from the most recent data available.

The solid black lines represent the boundary agreements reached by treaties with Soviet Russia and correspond practically with the ethnographic limits of the Lithuanian, Lettish and Esthonian peoples.

The heavy broken line shows the eastern boundary of Poland as fixed by the Supreme Council of the Allies—the so-called "Curzon-Polk line"—which also approximates the ethnographic boundary of Poland on the east. With this should be compared the new eastern boundary of Poland established by Poland's Treaty with Soviet Russia, which leaves a Polish corridor, or "panhandle" extending for hundreds of miles beyond ethnographic Poland and completely separating Lithuania from Russia.

The break in the solid black line on the southern boundary of Lithuania indicates the only region where, for a distance of about twenty-five miles, ethnographic Poland and ethnographic Lithuania are in direct contact. The boundary here remains to be settled by negotiation between Poland and Lithuania.

The Memel strip, bounded on the south by the River Niemen (Nemunas) and on the north and east by the old German frontier (indicated by a light broken line) was separated from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. It is expected to go to Lithuania, ultimately, but is at present administered under French military occupation. It contains Lithuania's only seaport—Memel.

In the spelling of names the Lithuanian language has been preferred, but for certain important places, whose Lithuanian names are unknown to the American reader, the familiar spelling has been given, *e. g.*, Kovno, Memel, Reval, etc.

The light broken lines in Lithuania and surrounding territory indicate boundaries of former Russian provinces.


REFERENCE
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian boundaries
Eastern Polish boundary set by Supreme Council (Curzon-Polk Line)
Eastern Polish boundary established by Soviet-Polish Peace Treaty.
0 50 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers
FINLANDIJOS ILANKA
GULF OF FINLAND
PETROGRAD
REVAL
Narva
ESTONIA
Pernava
Pernau
Peipus
Dorpat
PSKOV
RYGOS
ILANKA
GULF OF RYGA
Salis
Valk
BALTIJOS JURA
BALTIC SEA
Vindau
RYGA
LATVIA
Libau
Mitau
Dvina
Sventoji
Telšiai
Šiauliai
Aluksta
DVINSK
Drisa
Memel
Panevežis
Dysna
Polock
Nide
Raseiniai
Taurage
Ukmerge
LIETUVA
Tilže
Nemunas
Šventionis
Sesupe
KOVNO
KAUNAS
Neris
KOENIGSBERG
Vilkaviškis
Isrute
Mariampolis
N. Trakai
VILNIUS
Kalvarija
Alytus
Ašmena
Vileika
Varena
PRUSIA
Seirijai
Maladečna
Suvalki
Seinai
Merkine
Bastunai
Berzuna
Augustavas
Lyda
MINSK
GRODNO
Nemunas
Naugardukas
Narev
LOMZA
Baltstoge
Slanimas
GUDIJA
RUSIJA
LENKIJA
POLAND
Bug
Vistula
WARSAW
Brest-Litovsk
Pinsk
M. J. Vinikas

INTRODUCTION

In this little book the Lithuanian Information Bureau has assembled the opinions and arguments of some prominent Americans on the question of recognition of Lithuania and the Baltic States.

The letters and brief of Hon. William G. McAdoo were submitted to the State Department during the winter and spring of 1921. Mr. McAdoo deals with the Lithuanian case as a lawyer and statesman presenting the arguments for recognition in systematic and formal fashion. Readers of legal training will appreciate the straightforward, unsentimental logic of his presentation.

Dr. Herbert Adams Gibbons, well-known as a writer on international affairs, presents the situation of Lithuania and the Baltic States as fraught with dangers to world peace so long as the status of these countries remains unsettled. He points out the inconsistency and weakness of the policy of the United States Government toward Lithuania under the Wilson Administration and appeals to the Anglo-Saxon instinct of fair play to "give the Baltic Republics a chance."

Hon. Walter M. Chandler, Member of Congress from the City of New York, speaks as a warm friend of the Baltic States, acquainted by personal observation, during two visits to these countries, with their people, their governments and their economic situation. He also sets forth as a trained advocate the legal and political arguments for the recognition of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, which he has laid before the Department of State. His treatment of the subject is comprehensive, lucid and forcible.

A memorandum on the economic bases of Lithuania's claim for recognition, prepared by the Lithuanian Information Bureau, has been included in the booklet, following the brief of Mr. McAdoo. This mem-

orandum has also been presented to the State Department. It aims to prove that Lithuania is entirely capable of economic self-support, that she is in fact relatively prosperous, being an agricultural country which has shown wonderful powers of recuperation from the devastations of war, as indicated by her production of crops and live stock, and that she needs only a secure political status in order to develop a thrifty and prosperous trade.

The reader should note that the political situation has changed, both in Europe and the United States, since portions of this book were written. The League of Nations has abandoned the scheme of a plebiscite to determine the fate of Vilna, Lithuania's capital, and this question, as well as other matters of dispute between Lithuania and Poland, are being discussed by a Lithuanian-Polish Commission at Brussels, at the moment when this booklet goes to the press. The settlement of the German reparations question, the prospect of immediate restoration of direct relations between Germany and the United States, through the establishment of definite peace, the renewed participation of the United States in the deliberations of the Supreme Council of the Allies, all point toward increased stability in international relations. Some plan of concerted action between America and Europe toward the Baltic States must soon be reached. Latvia and Esthonia have already been recognized *de jure* by the Allies, and Lithuania has received the promise of like recognition in the immediate future. It is not believed that the United States can afford to take a radically different standpoint. Recognition of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia must surely come, but it will come more quickly and be therefore the more valuable if friends of these young republics—and we are confident that this means all fair-minded and informed Americans—will take an active interest in the matter and urge recognition upon the Government of the United States by every proper means.

LITHUANIAN INFORMATION BUREAU.

Washington, May 30, 1921.

LETTER TO HONORABLE BAINBRIDGE COLBY, SECRETARY OF STATE, FROM McADOO, COTTON AND FRANKLIN

Re: Recognition of Lithuanian Independence

FEBRUARY 15, 1921.

DEAR SIR:

In submitting herewith a separate memorandum on behalf of the Lithuanian Government in support of recognition by the United States, we respectfully invite your particular attention to the more important considerations applicable to the situation.

Traditional Policy of United States.

The United States Government is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of dependent peoples, a policy which has been emphasized by the expressions of the President during the late war. In the words of President Wilson, uttered on February 11, 1918:

> "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populace concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states."

Our "Russian Policy."

Apparently the main reason for the failure of this Government to apply these principles in favor of the recognition of Lithuania is contained in the statement of "our Russian policy" as announced in the Avezzana Note of August 10, 1920, and as reaffirmed in the Note on Armenia to Paul Hymans, President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, dated January 22, 1921. This policy is against the dismemberment of Russia, without the consent of the "old Russia, restored free and united."

As directly applied to the question of Lithuanian recognition, the State Department in a communication dated August 23, 1920, to Hon. Jonas Vileisis, Representative of Lithuania in America, stated:

> "Russia—the Russia of 1917—must herself be a party to any readjustment of her frontiers."

The desirability of securing the consent, if possible, of free and independent Russia to the readjustments of her former frontiers may be conceded. We firmly urge, however, that our hope for the restoration of a free Russia in the indefinite future should not be set up as an obstacle to the national aspirations of independent non-Russian peoples. To insist on the *status quo* until Russia shall emerge from her troubles would result in visiting upon the non-Russian border nations the misfortunes now attendant upon the great Russian nation.

Lithuanians Entirely Distinct from Russians.

In our natural reluctance to allow any selfish advantage to be taken of present chaotic conditions in Russia, to the prejudice of the Russian people, the significant fact should not be forgotten that the Lithuanian people are in every way, by race, language, and religion, distinct from the Russian people, and have never willingly submitted to Russian rule in the past, nor will they willingly submit in the future. Prior to the Nineteenth Century Lithuania flourished as a free and independent nation, and was forcibly annexed to Russia at the close of the Eighteenth Century through the right of conquest alone. In spite of the most pronounced oppression, the Lithuanian people were able to preserve their independence of thought, religion, and custom, never ceasing to look forward to the day when Lithuania, herself "restored, free and united," would again take her place among the nations of the world. Several unsuccessful uprisings took place, and finally on February 16, 1918, almost exactly three years ago, Lithuania proclaimed herself free and independent of all existing ties with other foreign powers, including, of course, former Russian dominion. Since that date she has maintained a democratic form of government with increasing vigor, successfully resisting the forces of the Soviet Government, until on July 12, 1920, a treaty of peace was concluded, in which the Soviet Government formally renounced all Russian claims to former sovereignty over the Lithuanian people.

Other Nations Have Recognized Lithuania.

The independent Government of Lithuania has been recognized de facto by the other great nations of the world. The United States has joined them in the recognition of Armenia, Poland and Finland. As

to those three nations, but not as to Lithuania, this Country has admitted that our policy against the dismemberment of Russia should not in all fairness be applied.

Non-recognition Does Not Help Russian People.

While the present misfortunes of the Russian people are to be deplored, it must nevertheless be remembered that the failure to recognize the independence of Lithuania has the effect, not of assisting the Russian people, but of throwing the Lithuanian people back into Russia, for the present at least, under Soviet control. This Government has consistently held to the belief that the Soviet Government must and will be overthrown. Any efforts by separate groups to throw off Soviet rule should, therefore, be encouraged. Lithuania has taken an important step in this direction, and should be given every encouragement to maintain her existing democratic form of Government, rather than relegated to her former condition as part of Russia, with consequent oppression from the only ruling power in Russia today.

There are other considerations, apart from the question of our Russian policy, in support of Lithuania's claim for recognition, which are treated in our separate memorandum. Without attempting here to discuss them all, we respectfully invite attention to two of the more important existing problems, which recognition of Lithuania by the United States will tend greatly to simplify.

1. THE POLISH SITUATION.

The presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian soil constitutes a grave menace to the peace of Central Europe. By the terms of her Peace Treaty with Lithuania, Soviet Russia agreed to respect the neutrality of Lithuanian territory so long as other nations similarly respected it. The presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian soil is a violation of this Treaty, involving the danger of an invasion of Lithuania by Russian troops which are already massed on the Lithuanian frontier for that purpose. Lithuania must be considered either as an independent nation or as part of Russia; no middle ground is possible. If she is part of Russia, Poland being at war with Russia, logically must be conceded the right to invade her territory. This in turn affords Russia the justification for a counter-invasion of Lithuania against the Poles. The danger of such a general embroilment of these nations cannot be too strongly emphasized. Even if a Peace Treaty should be signed at Riga, between Poland and Russia (which seems unlikely) Poland might still have to invade Lithuanian territory for strategic reasons.

Recognition Would Prevent War.

If Lithuania should be recognized by the United States, as an independent Nation, with consequent admission into the League of Nations and guarantees of territorial integrity, Poland would be obliged to withdraw her troops and could, from her own standpoint, safely afford to do so. Russia would then have no claim that Lithuania was allowing hostile troops upon her soil, the danger of Russian invasion would be largely averted, and in all likelihood a solution of this grave problem would thus be found.

2. THE PROPOSED PLEBISCITE.

The League of Nations is planning to hold a plebiscite in important localities in the eastern and southeastern portions of Lithuania, to determine whether these localities prefer to attach themselves to Poland or to Lithuania. It is obvious that the question cannot be fairly presented without the recognition of Lithuania on an equal footing with Poland. As the situation now stands, the question to be put to the voters would be in effect, "do you prefer to belong to a free and independent Poland or to attach yourselves to Lithuania, to be held in trust for Russia, with no guarantee of independence?" The grave injustice to Lithuania of a plebiscite on these terms is clear. Undoubtedly many districts ordinarily sympathetic with and even part of Lithuania, would choose independence as Poles rather than serfdom as Russians under the present Soviet control.

Russia's Rights Should Not Prejudice Lithuania's.

The problems presented by the readjustment of the Russian frontiers are concededly difficult of solution. We have no desire to allow selfish advantage to be taken of Russia's present unfortunate condition. On the other hand, it is respectfully urged that this chaotic state should not prevent the recognition of the just claims of independent non-Russian peoples, especially where the consequence of withholding recognition involves the subjection of such peoples to Soviet rule and where extending recognition offers the only rational solution of many problems involved in the Baltic situation.

Third Anniversary of Lithuanian Independence.

On February 16, 1921, will occur the third anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence by Lithuania. During this time its government has maintained itself, in the face of most unfavorable conditions, with increasing control and power. This anniversary would seem to

afford a suitable occasion for the United States to express, in the tangible form of recognition, its sympathy with the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people for independence.

Yours respectfully,

McAdoo, Cotton & Franklin.

Hon. Bainbridge Colby,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN BEHALF OF RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

From McAdoo, Cotton and Franklin

Supplementing the memorandum dated January 15, 1921, submitted by us to Hon. Norman H. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, on that date, we are setting forth below some of the more important considerations which apply to the claim of the Lithuanian Government for recognition by the United States.

I. SYMPATHY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES.

This principle was expressed at an early date in the history of our political relations by Secretary of State Buchanan as follows:

> "The Government of the United States has from its origin always recognized *de facto* governments as soon as they have clearly manifested their ability to maintain their independence." (See Moore, Digest of International Law, page 113.)

This policy has been stated on numerous occasions by President Wilson since the outbreak of the World War. The following declaration on February 11, 1918, is typical of many others:

> "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment of compromise of claims among rival states."

These principles have been directly applied in expressions toward Lithuania by Secretary of State Lansing in a communication to the Lithuanian National Council, dated October 15, 1919:

> "The Government of the United States is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of independent peoples."

Unless these principles must be considered to be modified by "our Russian policy," the claims of Lithuania would seem to properly fall within the principles of self-determination.

II. SUMMARY OF OUR RUSSIAN POLICY.

On May 26, 1919, a note was sent to Admiral Kolchak signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, President Wilson and Saionji, setting forth the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers toward Russia. In this note the policy was declared formally to restore order within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs, and to restore order along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state with its neighbors through the arbitration of the League of Nations. Feeling convinced that these ends could not be attained by dealing with the Soviet Government, they set forth certain conditions which they would expect Admiral Kolchak to observe if he should prove sufficiently powerful to dominate conditions in Russia. Among these conditions the following were stated:

> "Fourthly: That the independence of Finland and Poland be recognized, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.
>
> Fifthly: That if solution of the relations between the *de facto* Governments of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories, and Russia, is not speedily restored by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between the *de facto* governments and the *Allied and Associated* governments.
>
> Sixthly: That the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia be recognized."

Secretary Lansing's Policy.

The next statement of importance as applied to the status of Lithuania is contained in a communication to the Lithuanian National Council represented by M. J. Vinikas, Chairman, signed by Hon. Robert Lansing, dated October 15, 1919. In this communication, Secretary Lansing, answering the letters of the Lithuanian National Council on the subject of the provisional recognition of Lithuania, stated:

> "The question of the future status of Lithuania has been given careful consideration. As you are aware, the Government of the United States is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of dependent peoples. On the other hand, it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly constitutional government in Russia the principle of Russian unity as a whole."

Secretary Lansing then referred to the note to Admiral Kolchak mentioned above and stated:

> "It is believed that this arrangement assures the autonomous development of Lithuania, together with the other nationalities comprised within the former Russian empire, and wisely refers to a future adjustment the determination of the relations which shall exist between them and the new Russian Government."

Secretary Colby's Policy.

The next communication of importance on the question is the so-called Avezzana note of Secretary Colby, dated August 10, 1920. This note declared that the policy of the United States was against the recognition of the Bolshevist regime and a settlement of the Russian problem "upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia." The Secretary after referring to the sincere friendship of the Government of the United States for the great Russian nation struggling for self-government, expressed the confidence of the United States that—

> "restored, free and united, Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly protection."

The Secretary then stated:

> "Until that time shall arrive, the United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that as far as possible all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful determination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 15, 1919, and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. The same spirit was manifested in the note of this Government of March 24, 1920, in which it was stated with reference to certain proposed settlements in the Near East that 'no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia.'"

Acting Secretary Davis' Statement.

The final communication of importance is dated August 23, 1920, from Hon. Norman H. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, to Hon. Jonas Vileisis. In this communication Secretary Davis stated that the Department saw no reason to modify its policy with respect to withholding recognition from Lithuania. The communication then stated:

"However, some comments have appeared in the public press which interpret this statement of friendly purpose toward Russia as a rebuff to the non-Russian peoples along the border who aspire to a fuller and freer national life.

"This Government has held consistently to the belief that Russia—the Russia of 1917—must herself be a party to any readjustment of her frontier. The American people sympathize with the desire of the non-Russian people along the border for the largest possible measure of self-government, but it believes that any attempt to reach a permanent settlement of the complicated problems involved without the consultation and cordial consent of a government generally recognized as representing the great Russian people, will be futile. Unless all parties in interest can reach an amicable agreement among themselves there is no hope for permanent tranquillity."

From the above summary it is evident that the United States was not disposed to recognize Lithuania's independence in August, 1920, primarily because such recognition would involve, in the opinion of the Department, a departure from its "Russian policy."

Reconsideration Now Needed.

It is believed that since the date of the last communication mentioned above, August 23, 1920, there have been, among others, six important changes in existing conditions since that date, which would justify the United States in reconsidering the application of the Russian policy insofar as it affects the failure to recognize the independence of Lithuania. There will also be considered hereafter the more important reasons in support of the recognition of Lithuania at this time by the United States, apart from changing conditions.

III. IMPORTANT CHANGES IN CONDITIONS SINCE AUGUST 23, 1920.

Russia's Restoration Not in Sight.

(1) *There is now no hope of the restoration of the Russia of 1917 by Wrangel or Denikine.*

Whatever hope may have existed last summer that the Bolshevist regime would be overthrown and that the old Russia of 1917 would take its place through some tangible insurgent forces, no longer exists. At that time the forces of Wrangel and Denikine were a real factor in the situation. Kolchak had but recently been eliminated. It may well be that it would be preferable for a free and non-Bolshevic Russia to become a party to the adjustment of its former frontiers, but the elimination since last summer of all opposing forces by the Bolshevic regime

presents an impasse, if our policy as then stated is to be continued without modification.

Peace With Russia.

(2) *The terms of the Peace Treaty between Lithuania and Soviet Russia, concluded July 12, 1920, have now become known.*

Details of this treaty had not been received in this country at the time of the communication to Mr. Vileisis of August 23, 1920. By the terms of that treaty Soviet Russia has completely recognized the independence of Lithuania and renounced all claims to former sovereignty. It may well be logically that as the United States has not recognized the Bolshevic regime, it is not concluded by the provisions of this treaty. Conceding the logic of this situation, it nevertheless is undeniable that the only authoritative government in Russia has completely renounced all claims to Lithuania. The importance of this action, insofar as the rights of Lithuania are defined thereby, should be carefully weighed independently of the refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet Government of Russia.

Lithuania Not Admitted to League.

(3) *The League of Nations has refused membership to Lithuania.*

The request of Lithuania for admission to the League of Nations was refused last autumn primarily because the United States had not recognized the independence of Lithuania. Although this country is not at present a member of the League of Nations, there can be no doubt that the League is unwilling to take any action opposed to our expressed policies and the League in its rejection of Lithuania as a member laid great stress upon the refusal of the United States to recognize its independence. It is sufficient merely to state this circumstance, the importance of which to Lithuanian aspirations is evident.

Zeligowski's Seizure of Vilna.

(4) *The Polish situation.*

The details of the grave problem presented by the presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian soil are too well known to require extended discussion. The entire region around Vilna, the former capital of Lithuania, has been occupied by Polish troops under the command of Zeligowski. While Poland has disavowed responsibility for his actions, it is nevertheless a recognized fact that Poland is supplying him with fresh troops and materials of war, and that in adopting these measures she is acting largely for her own protection against Russia. A state of

war still exists between Poland and Russia, and Lithuania is in the unfortunate position geographically of the national "no man's land" between the warring countries. Under the present attitude of the United States, Lithuanian territory must be regarded as held in trust for Russia and Poland is therefore logically within her rights in occupying Lithuanian (Russian) territory. The situation is further complicated by the provisions in the treaty between Lithuania and Russia to the effect that Russia is only bound to respect the neutrality of Lithuania so long as troops hostile to Russia similarly respect it. Accordingly, the presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian territory *ipso facto* constitutes a violation of Lithuania's treaty with Russia and gives Russia the right to undertake similar invasion. This is not merely a bogie dangled by Lithuania before the eyes of the world to hasten its own recognition. The presence of large forces of Russian troops massed upon the Lithuanian border and the probability of an invasion of Lithuania against Poland by these troops has been reported in detail recently in the public press. The whole situation presents a grave danger which it is distinctly to the interests of the world at large should be unraveled. The solution can be found as a logical consequence of the recognition by the United States of Lithuania. If this recognition were granted with consequent admission to membership in the League of Nations, Lithuanian independence would immediately become a safeguard to Poland against Russia. Poland would then not have the excuse that Lithuania is part of Russia and subject to invasion. Upon the withdrawal of the Polish troops from Lithuania the danger of invasion from Russia would no longer exist. The Russian authorities have strongly asserted that they will respect the treaty with Lithuania so long as other nations respect it, and there would be no justification under the treaty for the invasion of Lithuania by Russia when the Polish troops are withdrawn.

Note to M. Hymans.

Moreover, recognition of Lithuania would not seem to be inconsistent with the expressions contained in the recent note to Paul Hymans, President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, dated January 22, 1921, with respect to the mandate of Armenia. In this note, Hon. Norman H. Davis, speaking for the President, said:

> "The unrest and instability along the border are caused by bitter and mutual distrust. The struggling new nationalities which were formerly part of the Russian empire are afraid to disarm and return to the works of peace, because they distrust the Bolsheviki and fear new aggression. The Soviets contend that they are afraid to demobilize because they fear new attack."

The note then urges the Associated Powers to give no encouragement for the invasion of Russian territory by such border states. In this note attention also is called to "the recent tragical events on the Polish front."

Polish Invasion of Lithuania.

There is certainly no disposition on the part of Lithuania to undertake an invasion of Russia. On the contrary, this action has been expressly negatived by the treaty of peace between the two nations concluded last July. It is the presence of Polish troops under General Zeligowski on Lithuanian territory which is largely responsible for the grave problem presented by the Baltic situation. Not only would the danger of the invasion of Russia by Poland be obviated by the recognition of Lithuania by the United States, but also the consequent danger of invasion of Lithuania by Russia would disappear with the withdrawal of the Polish troops. The guaranty to Russia as expressed in the note, "You can have peace if you want it," can, it is submitted, best be made by the recognition of Lithuania with the consequent withdrawal of Polish troops from Lithuanian (Russian) territory. This would not only remove Russia's reason to fear hostilities with Poland, but also Russia's excuse for invading Lithuania. If there are thereafter hostilities, in the language of this note the responsibility "would then be clearly placed."

Even if the negotiations between Poland and Soviet Russia at Riga should result in a treaty of peace (which according to the latest advices seems unlikely), the situation would not be greatly altered. The Soviet authorities have repeatedly declared that if they are obliged to sign the Riga treaty, it will be regarded as founded on coercion and will be nullified as soon as their forces have had an opportunity to be strengthened and co-ordinated.

Polish Corridor Into Russia.

Moreover, in any event, the status of Lithuania cannot be settled in this way. The territory to be accorded to Poland under this treaty consists of a narrow strip extending northward to the River Dvina; to the westward of this strip lies the territory of Lithuania. Poland, for strategic reasons, would in all likelihood be obliged to occupy this territory, if Lithuania is not recognized as an independent nation. Soviet Russia, which has guaranteed the neutrality of Lithuania, would undoubtedly regard the presence of Polish troops on Lithuanian soil as a violation of this neutrality, causing the same dangers of unrest and instability as exist at present.

Plebiscite in Vilna District.

(5) *The proposed plebiscite under the auspices of the League of Nations.*

This situation was discussed in a memorandum submitted by the Representative of Lithuania to the Department of State, dated December 21, 1920. The importance of a fair decision by the voters in this important locality of Vilna is apparent. It must be conceded that a fair decision cannot be had until the independence of Lithuania is recognized. The voters should not be asked to decide whether they prefer to attach themselves to Poland with consequent guaranties of independence or whether they prefer to be held in trust for Russia with no guaranties of future independence. The result of such a proposition would undoubtedly be that Poland would obtain a large and important area of land which is concededly Lithuanian both ethnologically and in sympathy.

Lithuania Resists Bolshevism.

(6) *Danger of sovietization of Lithuania.*

There can be no doubt as to the importance of national recognition as an antidote to soviet propaganda. The countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan have already become entirely sovietized. This result is accomplished through soviet propaganda which is conducted along the following lines: "Soviet Russia is fighting against the world to sovietize the world; failure on the part of the United States to extend recognition indicates a complete lack of sympathy with the national aspirations of the peoples formerly under Russian rule; therefore it is better for such peoples to throw in their lot with Soviet Russia which will guarantee autonomy and recognize their independence, provided a soviet form of government is adopted." So far Lithuania has resisted this propaganda and is likely to continue to do so, but in view of the extreme importance of Lithuania geographically as a barrier against Bolshevism between Soviet Russia and Central Europe any danger of the sovietization of Lithuania is an important consideration and should be counteracted by all possible methods.

IV. OUR POLICY AS TO RUSSIA AS ANNOUNCED IN THE AVEZZANA NOTE IS NO BAR TO THE RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA.

(a) It must be conceded that Lithuanians are a non-Russian people. Our policy against the dismemberment of Russia should not be applied as against a people which were identified with Russia only through the superior power of oppression. Lithuania in the eighteenth century and

earlier, was a great independent nation,—the powerful Lithuanian-Polish Republic,—which was conquered by Russia and partitioned between the three neighboring powers, Russia, Prussia and Austria, the greater part of the territory going to Russia. Lithuania has never willingly submitted to Russian rule. The religion of Lithuania is Roman Catholic. Its people are not Slavs but are ethnologically distinct. Even with the availability of the presence of the Russia of 1917, it is submitted that our policy would not require Lithuania to continue to submit to Russian rule. In the communication of August 23, it is stated that Lithuanians are a non-Russian people and it is submitted that our policy against dismemberment of Russia should not be applied against a people which is concededly non-Russian.

Recognition a Bar to Bolshevism.

(b) The underlying sentiment of the Avezzana note recognizes the hope that the people comprised within Russian territory will throw off the yoke of Bolshevism. This can never be accomplished at one time by concerted action on the part of such people. It must take place gradually here and there throughout Russia by setting up democratic forms of government with sufficient force to maintain themselves in opposition to the Soviet Government. In this way the Russian people will gradually be enabled to repudiate the Soviet Government. It is precisely this action which Lithuania has taken. It has set up a democratic form of government which proposes to defend itself against encroachment by Soviet Russia. It has in fact by arrangement with the Soviet Government forced the latter to recognize its freedom and renounce claims of sovereignty. Its recognition by the United States would not only be in line with the hostile attitude of this country towards Soviet Russia but would also be a source of much encouragement to other groups of people seeking to throw off Bolshevic rule.

V. LITHUANIA HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE OTHER GREAT POWERS AS A DE FACTO GOVERNMENT.

While this circumstance is not controlling upon the United States, it should be given due consideration in determining the *de facto* existence of Lithuania. That its independence exists *de facto* to an extent which would justify recognition must be conceded. It is likewise important that other powers have seen fit to recognize this independence. For the information of the Department there are attached to this memorandum translations of the notes extending recognition to Lithuania by the respective governments of (1) Great Britain, (2) France, (3) Finland, (4) Latvia, (5) Norway, (6) Poland, (7) Sweden, and (8) Soviet Russia. Lithuania has also been recognized by Italy.

Recognition Would Settle Baltic Problem.

In this memorandum there has been no attempt to discuss the ethnology of the Lithuanian people nor other facts connected with the location, resources, population, etc., of the country. These conditions have been fully explained in previous memoranda submitted to the Department and their discussion here would serve no useful purpose. This memorandum is submitted in the earnest conviction that the recognition of Lithuania by the United States should be accorded not only because such recognition would be well deserved by this independent and democratic people but also because it seems to present a real solution of many of the perplexing problems presented by the Baltic situation generally.

Respectfully submitted,
McAdoo, Cotton & Franklin,
120 Broadway, New York City.

Dated February 15, 1921.

COPY OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY GREAT BRITAIN

KAUNAS, September 25, 1919.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I have received a telegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, by way of Riga, stating that the Government of His Majesty of Great Britain has communicated to the Lithuanian Representatives that he is ready to recognize the Provisional Government of Lithuania as an independent state *de facto* on the same basis as the Nations of Esthonia and Latvia, and I have received orders to communicate this information to you.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) WARD, *Lieut. Colonel,*

Asst. Commissary for the Baltic Provinces.

To His Excellency,

The President of Lithuania,

Kaunas.

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY FRANCE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POLITICAL DIVISION

PARIS, May 11, 1920.

MR. MINISTER:

You have asked me several times to define the nature of the relations existing between Lithuania and the Republic of France.

The French Government is strongly inclined, as you know, to enter into relations of understanding and friendship with the Provisional Government of your country and it has been its pleasure to receive, with official standing, its representatives at Paris.

I am happy to assure you that the Government of this Republic recognizes provisionally the *de facto* Independence of Lithuania, pending the agreement of the Allied Powers upon the question of *de jure* recognition.

I take this opportunity to express to you the interest which I take in the development of cordial relations between Lithuania and France.

Accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) MILLERAND.

To Mr. V. de Milosz,

Lithuanian Minister,

Paris.

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY FINLAND

BUREAU OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HELSINGFORS, Nov. 17, 1919.
No. 10904.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter of October 23rd last by which I was informed of the desire of the Government of Lithuania to obtain from the Government of Finland recognition of the Independence of Lithuania and of its Provisional Government.

The President of the Republic, who has always been actuated by the most sympathetic feelings toward Lithuania, has ordered me to convey to your Excellency the information that he is happy to extend recognition to the Government of Lithuania as Government *de facto* of said country and that he extends the heartiest wishes for the prosperity of the new Nation and for the establishment of bonds of friendship between our two countries.

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) HOLSTI.

To His Excellency,
Mr. Galvanauskas,
President of the Council of
Lithuania, etc., Kaunas.

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY LATVIA

REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RIGA, Feb. 12, 1921.

Nr. p. 2368.

MR. MINISTER:

I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with the will of the President of the Constituent Assembly, the Cabinet of Ministers has decided to recognize Lithuania *de jure* as free and independent.

In sending on this occasion my heartiest good wishes to the Republic of Lithuania, permit me to express my most firm conviction that our two peoples will be united in even closer friendship in the future. The Government of Latvia is firmly convinced that the fraternal Letto-Lithuanian union constitutes the most solid basis for the consolidation of the independence and sovereignty of our young States. This friendship, nourished by our inextinguishable will to live independently, will permit us to go forward in the path of progress and prosperity, while pursuing our common ideals of justice and true liberty.

Accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Z. A. MEIEROVICZ,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania.

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY NORWAY

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

KRISTIANIA, August 22, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have had the honor to receive the letter by which your Excellency has kindly informed me that following the declaration of the Norwegian Government that it consents to recognize *de facto* the Lithuanian Nation and to accept its Representative, Mr. Jonas Augstuolis, Lawyer, has been designated as the Lithuanian Representative to the Government of Norway.

I thank your Excellency for this kind communication and for the sentiments which it expresses toward Norway.

In adding that I have provided a cordial welcome for Mr. Augstuolis, I take the opportunity to offer to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) LOEVLAND.

To His Excellency,

The President of the Council

of Ministers of Lithuania.

TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY POLAND

TELEGRAM

WARSAW, 1171 187.

4-7 20-16

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic
at Kovno.

MR. MINISTER:

I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the Polish Government has decided to recognize the Constituent Assembly of Lithuania and the Government placed in power by said Assembly as independent organizations *de facto.* Desiring to give at the same time practical testimony as to the sentiment which the Polish Nation has always entertained toward your country, sentiments which the past relations of the two Nations, so closely allied, will I hope serve to expand and strengthen, the Polish Government declares it is ready on its part to enter into friendly relations with the Lithuanian Government. The Polish Government believes that the application of principles of justice and equity in all the relations between the two countries and toward the national minorities of each other will form the most secure basis for this friendship.

I take this opportunity to present to you, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAPIEHA.

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TRANSLATION OF NOTE EXTENDING RECOGNITION TO LITHUANIA BY SWEDEN

BERLIN, December 12, 1918.

MR. MINISTER:

Referring to your interview with the Counsellor of the Legation, I have the honor to inform you that I have not delayed in acquainting my Government with the desire expressed by your Government to see Sweden recognize the Government of Lithuania as an independent State.

In accordance with the instructions of my Government I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the King, desiring to follow the same policy which it has followed in similar precedents, and recognizing the situation actually existing, is not able to accord a formal recognition of the Lithuanian State, but the Government of the King is entirely disposed to enter into unofficial relations *de facto* with the representatives of the actual Government of Lithuania.

In so far as your note refers to the handling of Lithuanian affairs in Russia by the Government of Sweden, my Government, not seeing its way clear to extending formal recognition for the present to the Lithuanian State, does not believe that it should charge itself with the protection of Lithuanian interests in Russia.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) VON ESSEN,

Minister of Sweden.

COPY OF NOTE ANNOUNCING RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

Embajada de la Republica Argentina

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 24, 1921.

MR. J. VILEISIS,
Representative of Lithuania in America,
703 15th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

We have the pleasure of informing you that according to cable despatches received at the Embassy, our Government recognized Lithuania as a free and independent State on March 14th, instant.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) FELIPE A. ESPIL,
First Secretary of the Embassy.

FAE:EHS

COPY OF NOTE ANNOUNCING RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY MEXICO

Embajada de Mexico

WASHINGTON, D. C., May fifth, 1921.

Sir:

The Government of the Republic of Mexico, which I have the honor to represent at this Capital, has instructed me to inform you that, after giving due consideration to the contents of your letters of February second and February the twenty-first, respectively, addressed to this Embassy, the Republic of Mexico, officially recognizes the independence of the Republic of Lithuania.

Allow me to give expression to the personal sentiments of gratification with which I have the honor to bring the foregoing to your knowledge and to request you to be assured that the people and the Government of Mexico will not spare any effort to entertain the harmonious and friendly relations that I am confident will always exist between them and the people and Government of the Republic of Lithuania.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Sir, the assurances of my distinguished consideration.

(Signed) MANUEL C. TÉLLEZ.

MONSIEUR J. VILEISIS,
Representative of Lithuania,
etc., etc., etc.,
Washington, D. C.

RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY RUSSIA

The Peace Treaty Between Lithuania and Russia

(Translation)

Article I.

Recognizing the basic right of free self-determination which belongs to all peoples, and which justifies the complete independence of the States of which they form a part, and which the Russian Socialist, Federated Republic of the Soviets has accepted, Russia recognizes unconditionally the sovereignty and the independence of the State of Lithuania with all the juridical consequences flowing from such recognition and Russia renounces forever all sovereign rights of dominion which she possessed heretofore over Lithuania and its territory.

The fact that Lithuania formerly formed a part of Russia does not impose upon the Lithuanian Nation any obligation toward Russia.

Moscow, July 12, 1920.

LETTER TO HON. CHARLES E. HUGHES, SECRETARY OF STATE, FROM WM. G. McADOO.

May 6, 1921.

RE: RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

In anticipation of seeing you personally next week on behalf of the Lithuanian Government's claim for recognition by the United States, I respectfully invite your attention to our letter to Secretary of State Colby, dated February 15, 1921, and to the memorandum submitted therewith (extra copies of which are enclosed) in which are set forth in some detail the considerations applicable to the situation. Having received no reply from Secretary Colby to this letter and believing firmly that a favorable decision should be given, I take the liberty of pressing upon your earnest consideration the arguments therein presented.

Plebiscite Abandoned.

In this connection it should be mentioned that since the date of the letter mentioned above, the plebiscite planned by the League of Nations for the so-called "Vilna District" has been temporarily abandoned, owing to the difficulties involved in its supervision by the League of Nations and perhaps because of Poland's military control of the area in question. In lieu thereof, the League has suggested that the boundary disputes between Poland and Lithuania be settled if possible by direct diplomatic negotiations under the auspices of the League, conducted through a joint commission of delegates from the two nations.

The abandonment of the plebiscite renders inapplicable our previous discussion of the unfairness of holding it without recognition of Lithuania by the United States, but does not postpone the necessity for such recognition. The latest advices indicate that a diplomatic settlement of the disputes will be impossible—Poland in the absence of recognition of Lithuania regards the Vilna District as territory without official status and appears to be relying upon her present military control to result in permanent acquisition of the area. The situation presents a real menace to peace which, I believe, recognition of Lithuania will tend greatly to lessen.

Upper Silesia.

The placing of Poland and Lithuania on an equal political and diplomatic footing in the United States is essential to the success of peaceful negotiations. In any case it will powerfully aid a peaceful outcome. The recent invasion of Upper Silesia by Polish forces, after the unfavorable plebsicite there, indicates an attitude which Lithuania, in the absence of recognition, may well have reason to fear, in the event of a diplomatic adjustment with which Poland may not be satisfied.

Recognition by Argentina.

To our previous memorandum are attached translations of notes extending recognition to Lithuania by other nations. To this list should now be added the Argentine Republic which has extended *de jure* recognition to Lithuania.

I sincerely trust that the United States, so favorably disposed to the national aspirations of dependent peoples, will give the request of the Lithuanian Republic for recognition the most careful and favorable consideration.

Faithfully yours,

William G. McAdoo.

Hon. Charles E. Hughes,

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR LITHUANIA'S CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE

The following facts and figures have been compiled by the Lithuanian Information Bureau, with the special purpose of disproving the statement, sometimes heard, that Lithuania is economically incapable of supporting herself as an independent State. The data herein are intended to present in condensed form what is most pertinent to Lithuania's economic situation.

Lithuania an Agricultural Country.

It may be observed, to begin with, that as Lithuania is more entirely an agricultural country than any of the States which have emerged as self-governing entities from the world war, she is in less need of assistance from without. She produces within her own borders everything necessary to a self-contained, independent existence. To be sure, she has no mineral resources, but not being an industrial country, she has no absolute necessity for them. On the other hand, Russia has no need of anything which Lithuania produces. This is not to say that Lithuania could lead a healthy existence merely as a "peasant republic," such as the Boer republics of South Africa. Her full cultural development of course demands active intercourse with other countries. But merely as a question of existence, Lithuania's position is as favorable as that of any country, and much more favorable, naturally, than that of a country like Switzerland, say, which has managed to maintain its independence during a period when larger and more powerful States have been broken up or absorbed by their neighbors.

I. AREA AND POPULATION OF LITHUANIA.

Lithuania, including the Memel District, has an area of 30,500 square miles, more than Belgium (11,373 square miles), The Netherlands (12,650 square miles), Denmark (13,580 square miles), or Switzerland (15,976 square miles). Lithuania's area and population are approximately the same as those of Bulgaria before the war.

The population of this territory in 1914 was 4,345,000, greater than that of Denmark (2,775,000), Norway (2,393,000), or Switzerland (3,781,000).

A large majority of the population is of Lithuanian blood and speech. Percentages: Lithuanians, 70 per cent; Jews, 13 per cent; Poles,

8 per cent; Russians and White Russians, 7 per cent; other nationalities, 2 per cent.

Population of larger cities: Vilna (capital), 214,600; Kovno, 90,300; Grodno, 61,600; Memel, 32,000; Suvalki, 31,600; Shavli, 31,300.

The rural population is 86.2 per cent of the whole, the urban population, 13.6 per cent.

Occupations.

The population was divided, by occupations, in 1897 (latest official figures) as follows: Agriculture and forestry, 71.4 per cent; industrial occupations, 7 per cent; commerce and transportation, 5.8 per cent; domestics and laborers, 6.1 per cent; officials and liberal professions, 2.2 per cent; army and navy, 3.4 per cent; other occupations, 2.8 per cent.

Education.

Number of schools before the war: Secondary schools, 10; all others, 600. In 1919 there were 31 secondary schools, 1,630 primary schools and 42 private schools. Several agricultural and other technical schools have also been established. In 1911 there was one school for each 3,054 of population; there is now one school for each 2,325. The Lithuanian Government spent in 1919 five times as much for educational purposes, relative to the proportion of Lithuanian territory actually administered, as was spent by the Russian Government before the war.

II. AGRICULTURE.

This is the chief occupation in Lithuania. Eighty per cent of the population are now engaged in agricultural pursuits. The entire area of arable land is 21,000,000 acres. (Compare with State of Indiana, where farms occupy 21,999,000 acres.) Before the war farmers (peasant proprietors) owned 50 per cent of the land, distributed as follows: One per cent owned 125 to 250 acres; 66 per cent owned 25 to 125 acres; 3 per cent owned 7 1-2 to 25 acres, and 30 per cent less than 7 1-2 acres. Great landed proprietors owned 40 per cent of the land and the government and churches owned 10 per cent. Seventeen per cent of the rural population owned no land. Of the public lands, 75,000 acres have been distributed during the past two years among soldiers and their families, in farms of from 25 to 50 acres.

Crop Production.

The staples are rye, wheat, barley, oats, peas, potatoes and flax. We give the average annual production before the war for the whole of Lithuania (excluding Memel, then part of Germany) and

for 1920, for that portion of Lithuania under the administration of the Lithuanian Government (about 5-8 of the whole, and also excluding Memel). It will be noted that as to wheat, peas and potatoes there is a relative increase in the 1920 crop over the pre-war figures. There is also a great increase in flax production, but pre-war figures for this are not available. The area planted in flax in 1921 was 50 per cent greater than pre-war.

	Pre-war average.	1920 (5-8 *of Lithuania*).
Rye	40,000,000 bushels	20,000,000 bushels

(The total rye crop of the United States in 1913 was 41,381,000 bushels.)

Wheat	3,680,000 bushels	2,760,000 bushels
Barley	11,500,000 "	6,900,000 "
Oats	31,500,000 "	17,500,000 "
Peas	2,400,000 "	2,200,000 "
Potatoes	57,000,000 "	36,800,000 "

(The potato crop of Switzerland in 1917 was the same as that of Lithuania for 1920—36,800,000 bushels.)

Flax	40,000 tons
Flaxseed	1,400,000 bushels

	Estimated exports of above products, 1920-21
Rye	600,000 bushels
Wheat	736,000 "
Barley	1,115,000 "
Oats	2,450,000 "
Flax	20,000 tons

Stock Raising.

We give the number of animals in 1913, in the whole of Lithuania, and in that portion which is now administered by the Lithuanian Government, also the number in 1920 for the latter territory. The actual increase in the quicker breeding animals, sheep and swine, as well as the relatively small diminution in the number of horses and cattle are notable when one considers the destruction of the war, and indicate Lithuania's power of recuperation.

	1913 (*all Lith.*).	1913 (5-8 *Lith.*).	1920 (5-8 *Lith.*).
Horses	762,000	495,000	380,000
Cattle	1,481,000	998,000	865,000
Sheep and goats	1,055,000	720,000	730,000
Swine	2,000,000	1,350,000	1,400,000

(Calves and lambs are not included in the above figures. Of the cattle 700,000 are milch cows.)

For purposes of comparison we give the numbers of stock and their value on January 1, 1919, in the State of South Carolina, which has an area almost the same as that of Lithuania (30,495 square miles) although the population is much less (1,515,400 in 1910).

	Numbers.	*Estimated value.*
Horses	82,000	$14,760,000
Cattle	447,000	24,228,000
Sheep	29,000	188,000
Swine	1,056,000	22,176,000

Forests.

These are Lithuania's greatest sources of wealth. More than one-fourth the territory is in forests, of which 80 per cent is pine and fir and 20 per cent hard wood. Half the timber cut is available for export. The normal annual production is 8,475,840,000 feet board measure. (Compare the figures for the State of Washington, which in 1918 cut about half the above quantity, 4,603,123,000 board feet.) Before the war most of the lumber was rafted into Germany and sawn and milled there. With establishment of sawmills in Lithuania this industry could be greatly and profitably developed. Value of timber exported in 1913, $13,000,000.

III. INDUSTRY.

Lithuania has never been a manufacturing country, largely because customs duties made it more profitable for her to export her raw material. Just before the war, however, certain industries, such as tanning and pottery, were beginning to develop. Labor is cheap in Lithuania and if machinery can be obtained it will be possible for Lithuania to profitably exploit her own raw materials. The factories were almost all destroyed during the war, but are being restored as rapidly as means permit. Total number of manufacturing establishments in Lithuania in 1913 was 5,140, employing 33,000 workmen and producing an annual value of $31,000,000.

IV. COMMERCE.

Exports and imports in 1913, exclusive of Memel: Exports, $20,000,000, of which breadstuffs, $3,000,000; cattle and their products, $4,000,000; forest products, $13,000,000. The imports were about $12,500,000, chiefly of coal, iron, textiles and metal manufactures, including machinery. (Compare Serbia with imports in 1912, of $20,625,000 and exports of $16,373,000.)

For the present year (1920-21) the exports of hogs, sheep and poultry should approach the normal, likewise exports of timber which during the first part of 1920 were seriously hindered because no tariff agreement had been reached with Germany. The recent abolishment of the Memel customs frontier should also be of great advantage.

Exports for the first six months of 1920 were of a value of 280,000,000 marks, while imports were 170,000,000 marks.

Shipping — Port of Memel.

It is to be supposed that the Port of Memel will belong to Lithuania in the near future. It will be Lithuania's only port. It is superior to Koenigsberg, to which, however, it was subordinated under German control. The average depth of water at Memel is 15 feet, while at Koenigsberg it is only 12 feet. Memel is free of ice at all times. The average number of vessels entered and cleared at Memel for the five years, 1909-13, inclusive, was 817; the average tonnage, 292,000. The value of cargoes for 1913 was 113,000,000 marks. This port could and would be greatly improved and developed under Lithuanian control.

Railroads.

The total mileage of railroads in Lithuania is 1,552 miles, of which 1,180 miles are broad guage and the rest narrow guage. The roadbeds are generally in good condition, but the ties need replacing. Thirty per cent of the railroad stations were destroyed during the war, but have been rebuilt provisionally. So also of the bridges, most of which are now of wood, except on the line Wirballen-Kovno-Vilna. Rolling stock is greatly needed. Gross revenue of Lithuanian railroads in 1913, $12,000,000; net revenue, deducting nothing for sinking fund, new equipment, etc., $6,500,000. Lithuania is to receive 88 locomotives and 1,400 cars from Germany, by the terms of the agreement between the Allied Military Mission and the German Railroad Administration. So far only 58 locomotives and 889 cars have been delivered.

Rolling stock on hand, December 31, 1920: (a) broad gauge roads; locomotives 115, cars 1,393; (b) narrow gauge roads; 52 locomotives (42 per cent out of repair), 671 cars (40 per cent out of repair).

Waterways.

Chief of these is the River Niemen, 500 miles in length, navigable for rafts 360 miles and for vessels 118 miles. As far as Smalininken (70 miles from its mouth) the Niemen is navigable for vessels of 420 tons. Small vessels go as far as Grodno. The principal

tributary of the Niemen, the Vilija, or Neris, is also navigable for small steamers for 45 miles. The Niemen is open for 230-270 days in the year.

V. FINANCE AND CREDIT.

Before the war there were about 300 State banks and a like number of private banks in Lithuania, with a total capital of $130,000,000. The savings banks had deposits of $80,000,000. These banks disappeared during the war. There are now three principal banks and a Co-operative Credit Association. The banks are: Lithuanian Commercial and Industrial Bank, capital 2,000,000 marks; Lithuanian Bank of Commerce, capital 4,000,000 marks; the "Bank of Rural Credit," capital 2,000,000 marks. Confidence and credit will improve as the political situation does so. The establishment of peace with Soviet Russia has had a good effect.

Currency.

The money in circulation is the "ostmark" issued by Germany during the period of occupation. It is guaranteed by Germany, and is equal in value to the German mark, for which it is freely exchanged. The circulation is about 1,000,000,000 ostmarks. There is also still a considerable quantity of Russian rubles and some Polish marks in circulation, but these are gradually being replaced by the ostmark.

VI. REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES, DEBT, ETC.

The direct taxes levied by the State are: (a) real property tax; (b) tax on private forests up to 8 per cent of sales of timber; (c) patents for commerce or industry; (d) progressive inheritance tax. An income tax is in contemplation. Indirect taxes are: customs duties; taxes on matches, tobacco and alcohol; export licenses; registrations and stamp taxes. The budget for 1920 provides for expenditures of 768,050,000 marks against an estimated revenue of 684,000,000 marks, leaving a deficit of 84,050,000 marks, to be met by a loan.

Soviet Russia has agreed, by the treaty of July 12, 1920, to pay to Lithuania the sum of three million rubles gold.

Germany advanced merchandise and funds to Lithuania, during the war, amounting to about 100,000,000 marks. On the other hand, Germany assumed the right of emission of paper money for Lithuania, which she still exercises, and exploited the resources of the country. Under the Treaty of Versailles there are also certain questions to be discussed regarding Germany's obligations. Hence the settlement of the above debt is pending.

Lithuania purchased from the United States army supplies in France to the sum of about $4,000,000.

A temporary internal loan of 30,000,000 marks raised in 1919 has already been repayed. An internal loan of 100,000,000 marks was recently voted by the Constituent Assembly. A loan is also being raised among Lithuanian citizens in America.

(Note.—The above memorandum was presented to the Secretary of State on Monday, May 16, 1921, by Representative W. M. Chandler, in connection with a plea for recognition of the Baltic States.)

LITHUANIA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

(This article originally appeared in the Century Magazine for January, 1921. Slight alterations, and an addition of several pages, have been made to bring it up to date.)

Without laying stress upon the influence of the Entente promises to free and defend small nations, none can understand the situation that has arisen since the armistices in the territories of the former Hapsburg, Romanoff, and Ottoman empires. The alternatives before the Paris peace-makers were treating all subject nationalities alike, in a spirit of impartial justice, with the idea of establishing a tolerable new world order; or blowing hot or cold upon the aspirations and claims of subject nationalities, with the aim of advancing the particular selfish interests of the strongest members of the conference.

Conflicting Policies in Europe.

The inability of President Wilson to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by his European colleagues made the latter choice inevitable. Why and how may always be moot questions, but the fact remains that the American exponent of the doctrine of self-determination failed to dominate the conference. Small states and subject nations lost faith in his power to help them. As a factor in the settlement, the United States, the only strong state with no ax to grind, the only power which might have filled the rôle of arbiter, was eliminated. Had it been possible for Great Britain, France, and Italy to agree upon a common policy by mutual sacrifices and compromises and a delimitation of spheres of influence, they could have played favorites among the small nations and emancipated races, and played them to win. The political organisms would have endured as Entente statesmen created them, and the frontiers as Entente statesmen drew them. But because those whose combined forces alone could have established peace have followed divergent and conflicting policies and do not play the same favorites, not a single new frontier line in central and eastern Europe and in western Asia is as yet definitely settled.

New Treaties.

What about the treaties Europe has signed? What about the League of Nations, which misguided Americans tried to convince their fellow-countrymen was functioning? What about the authority of the

Supreme Council of the victorious allies? Treaties are not binding unless force is behind them. The League of Nations is a hollow mockery without force behind it. The Supreme Council can be defied with impunity unless it is in a position to use force to win respect for its decrees. Gabriele D'Annunzio taught us this lesson soon after the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain were signed. He seized Fiume, and held it in defiance of Europe for a year and a half. General Gouraud, officially responsible to France, violated both the spirit and letter of Article XXII of the covenant by seizing Damascus, and forcing into exile one of the signers of the covenant.

Impotence of the League of Nations.

The unwillingness of members of the council of the League to abide by their covenant themselves and to agree to do their part in fulfilling the terms of the treaties imposed upon enemy nations led to other breaches of good faith and disturbances of the peace. For lawlessness breeds lawlessness. How can the Great Powers expect smaller states to observe the principles of international equity which they themselves ignore? One does not doubt the good intentions of Mr. Paderewski of Poland when he shook hands with Mr. Voldemar of Lithuania at the meeting of the council of the League of Nations in Paris last September. But the League of Nations was unable to prevent Polish aggression against Lithuania, even though the Polish member on the Council gave assurances of Poland's good faith. Had not Mr. Paderewski pledged his country at Paris a year before in the matter of the use of the Haller troops against Ukraine, only to find that his government repudiated the pledge?

Zellgouski's Adventure.

Refusing to recognize the authority of the League, and the binding character of an armistice entered into by his own Government, the Polish General Zellgouski invaded Lithuania, in October, 1920, took possession of the capital, Vilna, and marched on Kovno, giving battle merrily to the Lithuanians. Zellgouski had no fear of being called to account.

The Zellgouski escapade accelerated the whirl of the international whirlpool more than those of D'Annunzio and Gouraud. For this refractory Polish general mixed things up in the most dangerous spot in Europe. The differences between Yugo-Slavs and Italians, between Arabs and French, are of secondary importance to the general peace of the world in comparison with events in the border-lands between Germany and Russia and Poland. The support Poland has given to Zellgouski—or at least her failure to suppress him without foreign interven-

tion, as Italy finally did in the case of D'Annunzio—is jeopardizing the existence of Poland.

"Live and Let Live"

Poland cannot weaken Lithuania without weakening herself; she cannot destroy Lithuania without destroying herself; she cannot incorporate Lithuania without fattening herself for the slaughter. It is either live and let live with the border-states of the old Romanoff and Hohenzollern empires or repartition. The tragic lesson of history in this case is plain. Unless one believes that the German and Russian races have been crushed into impotence, Occidental Europe and America will play a losing game in establishing Poland as the lone sentinel, at the expense of her neighbors, between Germany and Russia.

Finland.

Finland had a great start in getting on her feet over her less fortunately situated Baltic sister republics. During the war she was not a battle-ground, and when the Petrograd revolution precipitated the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Finns were able to proclaim and maintain their independence. They were off in a corner by themselves, and not on the path to where the Bolshevists wanted to go. No other state laid claim to any portion of their territory other than the Aland Islands. They were able to hark back to the Treaty of Vienna, which had stipulated the preservation of the integrity and autonomy of the Duchy of Finland, and had sanctioned only a personal union with the Russian Empire. The Czar was to be Duke of Finland. The Finns argued with reason that the disappearance of the Czar annuled *ipso facto* the union with the Russian Empire. This paved the way to a speedy recognition of the independence of Finland by the Entente powers and neutrals, and the admission of Finland to the League of Nations. The successive revolutionary governments in Russia made no objection to the secession of Finland from the empire, but the compelling motive of speedy Entente recognition was the fact that Germany recognized Finland and had a powerful propaganda in Finland. Before the revolution the Entente powers had been bitterly hostile to Polish and Finnish aspirations, and this fact had won Finnish sympathy for Germany. Unlike Poland, Finland had no *terre irredente* to claim from the Central empires, and therefore saw in the victory of the Central empires her chance of breaking away from Russia. After the revolution, the Entente powers conveniently forgot the pro-Germanism of Finland. Being able to recognize Finland without offending Russia, they promptly did so, and began to intrigue to induce the Finns to attack the Bolshevists.

The Baltic Barons.

Prussian influence had been strong in the Baltic countries north of the frontier of 1795 ever since the Middle Ages. Memel and Libau and Riga were German-built cities. Almost to Petrograd a nobility of Germanic origin constituted the land-owning class along the coast, and German merchants abounded in the ports. The Baltic barons fell in readily with the extension of Russian sovereignty to the Baltic Sea in Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and became loyal servitors of the Russian Government and coöppressors of the subject races. And as readily, when the Russian armies were beaten in the World War, the Baltic barons welcomed their invading kinsmen and worked for the King of Prussia. The Russian Revolution did not give the other Baltic races the opportunity it gave the Finns. The Lithuanians were under German military domination. The Latvians were in the field of military operations until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. The Esthonians soon had to cope with the Bolshevist movement, of which Reval, their capital, became a center.

Lithuania is Not Pro-German.

At the end of 1917, Lithuania, like Poland, was offered independence by the Austro-Germans in exchange for a political alliance, economic advantages, and military coöperation against the Entente. Intrigue and intimidation failed. The Lithuanians not only resisted with success the pressure of their conquerors, who tried to disguise themselves as liberators, but held a national council at Vilna on February 16, 1918, which proclaimed the independence of Lithuania, declared against special favors either to the conqueror or the former master, and set up a provisional government. Kaiser Wilhelm first, and the King of Saxony later, tried to beguile the Lithuanians into forming an alliance with Germany. Is it conceivable that the Lithuanian leaders who defied Germany in her hour of triumph and when their country was held by a German army have been in connivance with defeated Germany?

When Dr. Vileisis, a member of the Lithuanian Government, came to the United States recently to try to secure American recognition of Lithuanian independence, I was told by a highly placed Pole that he was "notoriously pro-German, like all the Lithuanian politicians." When I inquired into the record of Dr. Vileisis, I found out that he had been arrested by the Germans, thrown for several months into prison and threatened with execution because he would not aid the Germans, and then exiled to an internment camp in Germany. There has been a systematic and persistent propaganda in the United States, in which certain men connected with the State Department have had their part, to represent the Lithuanians as pro-Germans, Bolshevists, or Poles. You can take your choice.

Effect of German Defeat.

Real liberation and the hope of statehood came to the Baltic Sea republics only after the defeat of Germany. At Vilna for Lithuania and at Riga for Latvia, independence was formally proclaimed and governments set up before the Germans withdrew. The Esthonians at Reval were already under a regularly constituted independent government. There was no more reason to doubt the genuineness and permanency and legitimacy of these national movements than in any other part of Europe. The Baltic Sea republics, ethnographically and historically, had as much right to expect from the victory of the Entente the revival of their nationhood as Poland and Bohemia.

Baltic Aid Against Bolsheviki.

Before the conference met at Paris, the powers of the victorious alliance had entered into diplomatic relations with the Baltic Sea republics. They received accredited military missions, and their governments had no intimation that they would be treated differently from Poland. In fact, they were assured that formal recognition of their independence and a seat at the peace conference were withheld only because it was necessary not to discourage or discredit the anti-Bolshevist generals to whom the Entente was giving military aid to crush Lenine. As they felt that their existence depended upon the overthrow of the Moscow soviet, or at least in keeping soviet propaganda away from their own countries, the Baltic Sea republics were content with informal pledges. They realized the delicacy of the situation and kept in the background at Paris. On the other hand, their coöperation alone made possible the military plans of the Entente against the Bolshevists. They allowed their territory to be used as a base of operations against Petrograd and Moscow, they received military supplies from the Entente powers, and were guided by the advice of the military missions in the projected campaigns against Petrograd and Moscow.

Failure of Attacks on Bolsheviki.

The Baltic Sea republics needed food and supplies and money. Ravaged and plundered during five years by Russians and Germans alike, they were beggars who could not choose their friends. Loyalty and decency did not seem to abide in Entente diplomacy any more than in that of the Germans. But the Baltic states could not break with us. As long as there was hope of killing sovietism, the Baltic Sea republics were ready to work with us. The complete disasters that attended the anti-Bolshevist movements opened the eyes of the Baltic Sea republics.

Yudenitch, the Archangel Republic, Koltchak, and Denikin had been induced by Entente military missions to attack Lenine. But each in succession had been left in the lurch to shift for himself when the fortunes of war changed. We were merely rooters on the side lines. The withdrawal from Archangel was the strongest possible argument against a Baltic Sea republic invasion of Russia. The plan of using the Baltic states for pulling Entente chestnuts out of the fire had to be abandoned. The military missions limited their political efforts to preventing the Baltic republics from signing peace.

Esthonia Makes Peace With Russia.

The Koltchak debacle and the abandonment of the Archangel front by the Entente armies compelled Esthonia to treat with the Bolshevists. A glance at the map will convince any fair-minded man that the Esths had no other choice. It was peace or extinction. The Entente missions strenuously objected to the negotiations, but they failed to advance the only argument that would have counted, a definite pledge of military aid to the amount of two hundred thousand Entente troops to be kept in the country as long as the Esthonian Government had reason to fear a Bolshevist invasion.

"Moral Support."

The Peace of Dorpat, signed on January 21, 1920, was not evidence of Esthonian perfidy or pro-Bolshevist leanings. It was evidence of the complete military importance of the Entente and the United States and of the failure of our blockade to destroy sovietism in Russia. During the recent Presidential campaign, Mr. F. D. Roosevelt told the Poles of Milwaukee that they had Senator Lodge to thank for the presence of the Bolshevist army before Warsaw, because, if the United States had been a member of the league, the Bolshevists would not have dared to cross the Polish frontier. And yet Mr. Roosevelt was careful to add (for the sake of the votes of mothers present) that our aid to Poland would have been only "moral." If the Esths, face to face with the Red armies, had refused to make peace with Lenine, relying on the "moral support" of the League of Nations, what does our common sense tell us would have happened to Esthonia? Esthonia was bitterly reproached for having signed the Peace of Dorpat by the very journals and men who, seven months later, gave Poland in a similar plight urgent counsels to do what they had denounced Esthonia for doing.

Poland, Lithuania and Latvia Make Peace With Russia.

There is no word of condemnation for Poland because she signed the Peace of Riga in October, 1920. In fact, she was officially advised to make peace with Lenine. But abandoning the fight against Moscow and

establishing official relations with Lenine have been used against the Baltic Sea republics as reasons for considering them pro-Bolshevist and withholding recognition of their independence. For Latvia and Lithuania had to follow the lead of Esthonia and Finland, and anticipated the Russo-Polish treaty by a few months. The treaties have now been published. They contain no provisions more advantageous to the Bolshevists than those of the Russo-Polish treaty of Riga.

Great Britain Recognizes Baltic States.

The Englishmen at Dorpat last January worked just as strenuously as their Allies to prevent Lenine from getting the Esths to make peace; but once the treaty was signed, they accepted the situation and sought to make the best of it. Not under the spell of the quixotism that seems to inspire our State Department in its foreign policy, and having no valid reason, as the French had, to maintain the integrity of Russia and refuse to deal with Bolshevism until money owed by the old régime was paid or acknowledged as a legitimate obligation, the British recognized the independence of the Baltic Sea republics and entered into diplomatic relations with them.

Italy and France Recognize Baltic States.

Italy, impatient for some solution, no matter what, of the Russian imbroglio, followed Great Britain's lead. France did not dare to stand out against *de facto* recognition. To abstain from diplomatic intercourse with the Baltic Sea republics would have been to renounce the economic exploitation of these countries in favor of the British. So the Baltic representatives are received at the Quai d'Orsay, and French diplomats are working at Libau and Riga and Reval to prevent a British trade and banking monopoly in Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, and to throw a monkey-wrench in the works of the British naval machine which is aiming at the supremacy of the Baltic Sea.

Economic Laws.

All this has not come about in a minute. The changed attitude toward the new political *status quo* in the eastern Baltic and toward the question of trading with Russia is due to the remorseless working of economic laws which prove in the long run more powerful than the *combinazione* of statesmen. Politics naturally yields to economics, for trade is the *raison d'être* of the foreign policy of nations. Prejudices die hard. The influences working against the stability of the Baltic Sea republics at London and Paris are still strong. French opposition among anti-Bolshevists, Russian bond-holders, and *amis de la Pologne* is still active. A reactionary group in Great Britain, led by Winston

Churchill, is ready to sacrifice the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Esths to whatever Russian Government may be able to stamp out Bolshevism and replace Lenine and his associates. The Russians who pulled the strings for the Entente in the various anti-Bolshevist fiascos still watch the development of the Baltic situation and refuse to admit any diminution of "integral Russia." Polish propaganda ridicules the right of the Baltic races to separate existence.

Colby Note of August 10, 1920.

Under these conditions, the observer of European international politics who believes in a square deal for everybody deplores the Colby note of August 10, 1920. None questions the good faith of Mr. Colby and his associates in their anxiety to convince the Russian people of our detachment and good-will and to try to reconcile our implacable opposition to Bolshevism with our affection for Russia. Our State Department undoubtedly meant well, and thought it was making a masterly move; but one does not need to go farther than the Encyclopaedia Britannica, certainly an impartial source in the present debate, to convince oneself, by glancing over the admirable summaries of historical facts from the best sources, of Mr. Colby's unfairness and inconsistency in announcing in the same document that the policy of the United States is to preserve at all costs "Russian integrity" and at the same time to maintain Poland's territorial integrity by "the employment of all available means."

Austria-Hungary and Russia.

After reading in the Britannica the stories of the formation of the two political organisms of 1914, Austria-Hungary and Russia, compare Mr. Wilson's note of September 7, 1918, to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Did not the Romanoffs as much as the Hapsburgs build their empires upon the ruins of small races of alien blood and institutions and religion? If the moral sense of the world demands the liberation and restoration to nationhood of races in slavery to Austrians and Hungarians, how can Mr. Colby declare that the policy of our Government stands for the return to slavery of nations whose life was extinguished by the Russians? We asked the blessing of God upon our arms to assure us the victory because we were fighting for humanity. In our prayers we put no limit on our philanthropy.

America's Promise to Oppressed People.

On July 4, 1918, when President Wilson received the representatives of subject races at Mount Vernon, he made a solemn pledge in the name of the American people to *all* subject races. A Lithuanian

stood with the others before Washington's tomb. Neither in that speech nor in any other did Wilson say, "You understand, of course, that the victorious allies mean to free and restore only the subject races whose freedom and restoration will be at the expense of and to the confusion of our enemies." Had he said this, it would have been a manly confession—to avoid false hopes and false pretences—of what was afterward evident at the peace conference, that the yearning for humanity was a sham and the proclamation of the doctrine of self-determination a falsehood. The moral issue was simply bunk to make people feel good and arouse them against the Germans. Because races were conquered by the Romanoffs, have they less right to freedom than if they were conquered by the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns?

Inconsistency of "Russian Policy."

When we read carefully the Colby note, which is meant to justify the refusal of the State Department to follow the example of our associates in recognizing and dealing with and helping the Baltic Sea republics, we can challenge its logic as well as its misrepresentation of the American idealism expressed by President Wilson during the war. Poland and Finland were portions of "integral Russia"; so was Russian Armenia; so was Bessarabia. Without consulting Russia, we have recognized the independence of Poland, Finland, and Armenia, and have agreed to the inclusion of Bessarabia in Rumania.

Treaty of Vienna.

The State Department expert will respond that Poland and Finland had a special status under the Treaty of Vienna. Why go back in regard to Russia only to the Treaty of Vienna? In making the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain we canceled the Treaty of Vienna. We ignored this treaty and all other treaties in dealing with subject races of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The attempt to justify partiality of treatment between Poland and the Baltic Sea republics on the ground of the Treaty of Vienna fails even if we did accept the Treaty of Vienna as the law and the prophets. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania enjoyed an individual status in the Russian Empire by virtue of arrangements made before the Napoleonic period and not infringed upon until 1830. The charter of Lithuania was not finally abrogated until 1848, and the title of grand Duke of Lithuania was assumed by the Russian Czar on a par with that of King of Poland and Grand Duke of Finland at coronations. This acknowledgment of the separate identity of Lithuania in the empire was never given up. The late Nicholas was crowned Grand Duke of Lithuania.

Lithuania on Same Footing as Poland.

From a historical point of view the American State Department has no ground to stand upon in regarding Lithuania as a Russian province and at the same time holding that Poland is an independent kingdom. The relations of the two countries toward the Russian Empire are strikingly alike. Both lost their independence through the partitions of the eighteenth century, after having been for centuries great and flourishing empires. Both suffered horribly from czardom during the nineteenth century. Both were battle-grounds during the late war.

Commissioner Gade's Opinions.

Commander Gade, an American reserve naval officer who represented us in the Baltic provinces and has since been able to impress his personal opinions upon the State Department, justifies the nonrecognition policy on practical economic grounds. He maintains that these countries cannot exist independently, and ought not to be encouraged in their aspirations for nationhood, because Russia needs them as an economic outlet to the sea, while much of their prosperity must come from transit trade. Commander Gade has advanced this point of view earnestly and plausibly. It appeals to American common sense, which believes that in union there is strength.

Nationalist Movements.

But we forget the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. One may have his own opinion about the advisability of the policy of *émiettement* (breaking in pieces) of political organisms that represented the economic evolution of past centuries. We are committed, however, to just that policy. It is too late to question it. I have never been an unreasoning and sentimental pleader for the doctrine of self-determination, but I have maintained, as a student of nationalist movements, that the effort to limit the application of self-determination to races whose liberation helps the fancied interests of a few great powers is disastrous and makes impossible the establishment of peace.

Economic Strength of Lithuania.

Political expediency is never more than a temporary makeshift. Old problems are solved only by creating new ones. It stands to reason that we cannot in one breath lop off frontier provinces from Germany on the ground of the alien character of their inhabitants and destroy the Hapsburg Empire on the ground of the right of its various elements to an independent existence, and in the next breath tell other, *and neighboring* subject races that they have no future outside of the Romanoff

Empire. Lithuania has a better economic *raison d'être* than Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Lithuania and the other Baltic Sea republics have precedents that refute the argumentation of Gade and our State Department not only in regard to their right and ability to exist independently of Russia, but also independently of one another.

Belgium and Holland.

If the reader will take the map of Europe and look at the location of the German Empire and follow its river courses in relation to Belgium and Holland, and then compare the similar situation of Russia in relation to Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, he will readily see how the Gade position, which our State Department has foolishly adopted, resembles the position of German economists toward Belgium. Standing between a great empire and the sea is no reason to deny the right of a race to nationhood. The Dutch and a part of the Belgians are very much closer the Germans racially than the Lithuanians and Latvians are to the Russians and Poles. The access to the sea argument for a big fellow crushing the life out of a little fellow I thought we had definitely scotched. It is disconcerting to see it crop up in our own country in official circles. The other two parts of the Gade economic argument are also refuted by Belgium and Holland. These countries have existed economically, flourished, and been able to defend themselves against Germany, England, and France. And they have existed now for nearly a hundred years as separate entities. Why should not Baltic Sea states get along as well as North Sea states? The Baltic Sea already has little states less extensive in territory and some of them less populous than the new Baltic Sea republics.

Federation With Russia.

But Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, by asking for the recognition of their independence, do not close the door upon the possibility of a Russian federation or a federation among themselves. In this time of upset and confusion they are asking simply for a free hand to look out for their own interests. As Russian provinces, with no separate international status, they could resist neither Bolshevists nor Russian reactionaries. They would be in the plight of the rest of Russia now, and tomorrow, when the reaction comes, have to submit to a return to the old intolerable conditions, alien landowners and alien office-holders grinding the life out of them.

The Baltic Sea republics may develop into vigorous independent states, or they may return to membership in the political organism of a new and regenerated Russia; but in the meantime they have to live, and when the moment for the reconstitution of integral Russia comes,

these subject races will know by experience whether independence is possible or preferable from an economic point of view, and will be able to lay down political and social stipulations if they feel that it is wisest to go back to Russia.

"A Complete Reversal."

The best thought in Great Britain is in favor of looking upon the Baltic Sea republics in this light. The British Government stands for giving them a chance. The Anglo-Saxon instinct says, give them a chance! Why do we have to tolerate such an unjust and stupid policy as that outlined in the Colby note? One is thankful that President Harding has promised "a complete reversal" of American foreign policy. For our honor as well as for our interests, the election of Harding is a great victory. We may not be able to take on the defense of the small nations the world over; at least we shall refrain from giving official sanction to stifling their aspirations.

Poland's Territorial Appetite.

In an article in The Century for November, 1916, advocating independence for Poland, when the Poles had no friends in Entente official circles and Americans regarded the resurrection of Poland as a dream in the category with the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, I warned the Poles against the danger of an inordinate territorial appetite. A year later, when the Russian Revolution had made encouragement of Poland a diplomatic possibility for the Entente, I heard M. Roman Dmowski, at the Comité National d'Etudes in the Cour de Cassation, Paris, set forth the aspirations of Poland. M. Dmowski spoke as if two racial units alone, the Russians and the Poles, faced each other from the Baltic to the Black Sea. He limited the problem of the future border-lands between Russia and the Central empires to the recognition of Poland's independence and the backing of Poland's claims at the peace conference. Dmowski did not mention the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. This was the beginning of a policy that has ruled the Polish attitude toward the eastern frontiers of their state. The Poles insisted in the west on the inclusion of every district inhabited by Poles. In the east they have regarded the ethnographical argument as non-existent.

Lithuania's Relations with Poland.

Poland claims all the Russian borderlands, including Lithuania, as part of historic Poland. The Ukrainians and Lithuanians, whose ethnographical territories are thus refused them, claim also to have ruled all these lands at one time. The Lithuanians deny ever having

been conquered by the Poles or having formed more than a personal union with the Polish state, and declare that they were victims of the partitions not as a part of Poland, but as an independent state. The historic argument applied to the Russian border-lands is very much like that used by the Balkan States in their rival claims to Macedonia. At some time or other each in turn was the upper dog and owned the disputed territories.

Polish Policies.

The ungenerous attitude of Poland toward all her neighbors is peculiarly disheartening. One would think that the Poles had suffered so much from the hands of their masters that they would instinctively refrain from playing the detested rôle themselves. But one must reluctantly admit that the Poles seem to have learned only how to employ the brutal methods of their own conquerors. As Russians and Germans acted toward the Poles, so have the Poles been acting toward Lithuanians and Ukrainians. We remember how the Poles pilloried the colonization schemes of their Prussian masters. Exactly the same schemes they are adopting in turn toward weaker races.

The Poles have taken on as enemies all their neighbors, Germans, Czecho-Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians and Lithuanians. The state they propose to form contains so many alien enemies in juxtaposition geographically to "brothers of blood" that it is bound to collapse under the weight of a circle of irredentist movements. The Poles should have made friends with the Lithuanians. But they have stood behind the high-handed seizure of the capital of Lithuania, and, instead of disavowing the outlawed general, they have made his military adventure the basis of bargaining with the League of Nations for additional territory at the expense of Lithuania.

The League of Nations.

The attitude of the League of Nations towards Lithuania is most disheartening. It proves that the Council of the League is not an impartial body, dispensing justice among nations for the common good of all, but a group of statesmen furthering special interests. Decisions of the League are being made on the principle of *do ut des*. The dispute between Lithuania, the victim, and Poland, the aggressor, is not decided according to its merits, but is one small pawn in the game of compromise between France, Great Britain, and the other states,

Zellgouski's Raid.

The facts of the case are these. When the League of Nations took over the adjudication of the frontier between Poland and Lithuania, both countries agreed to an armistice, and the line between the opposing armies was settled by the League of Nations. Within a month after this agreement was signed, the Poles violated the armistice, made a surprise attack, and in a few days not only occupied the disputed frontier territory, but went a long distance beyond and seized the capital of Lithuania.

Proposed Plebiscite.

The methodical preparations for this move had long been observed by the Lithuanians, but when Mr. Voldemar pointed out to the Council of the League that Poland was preparing to anticipate by violence the award, he was assured that this would not be allowed. After the *coup,* the Lithuanian Government received no satisfaction from the Council. The Polish Government denied responsibility for Zellgouski, and claimed that the army of General Zellgouski was composed of men from the disputed territory. The League of Nations finally agreed to settle the matter by means of a plebiscite, but including in the plebiscite area the district of Vilna, capital of Lithuania! To guarantee a fair vote, the plebiscite area was to be occupied by an international body of troops. But in the meantime, General Zellgouski has reigned supreme, encouraged by Poland and reaping the rewards of his defiance of the League of Nations. He is "preparing" the country he occupies for the plebiscite!

Russia's Attitude.

Russia has now intervened in the question. This was to be expected. Russia's rights and interests in the relations between Poland and Lithuania are far more important than the League of Nations. We might say, in fact, that it was folly on the part of the League of Nations to believe that any territorial matters of this sort could be settled without consulting Russia. Russia has treaties of peace with both the Poles and the Lithuanians. Her Government is virtually at war with the Governments controlling the League of Nations. These Governments have been doing all in their power for several years to destroy the present Russian Government. Russia, therefore, declares that the League of Nations has no business interfering in matters that concern her and her neighbors, with whom she is at peace. The terms of the treaties between Russia and Poland and Lithuania have nothing to do with the League of Nations, and their interpretation and execution is a matter of direct negotiation between Russia and her neighbors.

Consequently Russia has served notice on Poland that the presence of the Zellgouski troops in Lithuania, beyond the lines agreed upon in the Treaty of Riga, is a violation of that treaty, and that Poland must withdraw her troops. If Poland disavows General Zellgouski as a rebel over whom she has no control, Russia feels that she is free to act, and, since Poland has disavowed Zellgouski, whatever the Russians do to him will not of course affect the friendly relations between Russia and Poland!

At the same time, the Russian Government has warned Lithuania that the presence of troops of the League of Nations will not be tolerated in the proposed plebiscite area. Russia points out that the experiences of the past few years have given her reason to be suspicious of a new intervention in her internal affairs, and that the presence of foreign troops at Vilna is a menace to the security of Russia.

United States Must Take Definite Stand.

Russian intervention and the quarrel between Poland and Lithuania makes it necessary for the League of Nations and the United States to take a definite stand on the question of the recognition of the Lithuanian Government. Either Lithuania is a province of Russia or she is an independent country.

Lithuania Not a Province of Russia.

If Lithuania is a province of Russia, the *de facto* Russian Government is justified in intervening in the Vilna dispute to prevent Poland, with or without the help of the League of Nations from alienating territory from the Russian Empire. Such action is in accordance with the Colby note of August 10, 1920, and should receive sympathy and support from those who believe in maintaining the integrity of the Russian Empire. For in this case Lenine is not acting as a Bolshevist, but as a patriotic Russian, to defeat a scheme of Poland, with foreign aid, for grabbing more Russian territory. If Lithuania is a province of Russia, the League of Nations certainly has no right to adjudicate the dispute between the Poles and the Lithuanians. The signature of the Lithuanian Government to whatever compromise the League of Nations suggests would have no value!

Why Not Recognize Lithuania?

But if Lithuania is an independent nation, what reason is there for withholding formal recognition of that independence? And if the League of Nations still insists upon the Lithuanian Government receiving the international troops for the purpose of a plebiscite, it is only fair to admit Lithuania to membership in the League of Nations, to accord

her equal rights and an equal opportunity for justice with Poland, and, above all, to be ready to defend Lithuania against the threatened invasion of a soviet army. Moscow is simply asking the world to state what it intends to do in regard to Lithuania. If the world yields to the threat of Lenine, abandons the idea of occupying (and defending!) Vilna, and lets both Poles and Russians use unchallenged the argument of force in relation to Lithuania, is not the League of Nations a farce? And what can we call the policy of the Wilson administration towards Lithuania?

PLEA OF HON. WALTER M. CHANDLER, FOR RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTHONIA, PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MAY 16, 1921

Mr. Secretary, I wish to present at this time facts and arguments in favor of the recognition by the United States of America of the independence *de jure* of the Baltic Republics of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania:

The great war brought about a new era in this history of mankind. It recast the map of the earth and created a new political world for the human race.

The group of men who composed the peace conference at Paris, in reconstructing the map of the world and in determining the rights of peoples with reference to the boundaries then created, were guided by certain well-known political principles. These principles were represented, in part, by the theories of President Wilson in his famous fourteen points.

Self-Determination.

One of these points related to the so-called doctrine of self-determination, a doctrine first proclaimed on this continent by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, when he declared that all just powers of government were derived from the consent of the governed, and later beautifully described by Lincoln in his Gettysburg address as "government of the people, by the people and for the people."

By self-determination is meant, as I understand it, that any considerable group of people having a proper physical basis of territory and population, with certain national earmarks or characteristics of race, language, and religion, can claim this right of self-determination, provided a proper educational basis of citizenship can be shown, and provided further, that many years of oppression have been exercised by the dominating power over the smaller power seeking separation and claiming rights of self-determination and independence.

Bases for Independence.

It quite naturally follows, then, that the small nation that asserts independence and claims rights of self-determination, in the reconstruction of the map of the earth after the Great World War, must show the existence of four essential concurring elements:

(1) The requisite physical basis of geography, territory, and population.

(2) Certain well-defined distinctions in blood, language, and religion that differentiate its people radically from the people of the larger nation from whom separation is sought.

(3) An educational basis of citizenship that justifies the enjoyment of rights of self-determination and independence.

(4) Governmental oppression, extending over decades or centuries, exercised by a larger over a small nation, rendering self-determination by the smaller nation a supreme necessity.

Now, it is easily demonstrable that all these conditions and characteristics exist in the history of the Baltic Republics of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Let us consider briefly each of the above subdivisions in order.

Areas and Populations.

(1) *The extent of the areas of the Baltic States with reference to rights of self-determination and independence.*

The following tables of comparative statistics furnish satisfactory proof on this point:

(A) Baltic Group

	Area. Square miles.	*Population.*
Esthonia	16,500	1,750,000
Latvia	24,442	2,552,000
Lithuania	30,500	4,500,000

(B) Group of Other Independent States

Holland	12,648	6,114,000
Belgium	11,373	7,633,000
Denmark	15,388	2,772,000
Switzerland	15,976	3,780,000
Greece	41,690	4,363,000
Montenegro	5,570	516,000
Norway	124,860	2,392,000

An examination of these tables will show that all of the Baltic States, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are larger in territory than Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, and Montenegro. It will also show that both Latvia and Lithuania are greater in population than Montenegro and Norway, and that the population of Lithuania is greater, as her territory is larger, than that of Denmark and Montenegro combined.

It will thus be seen that the first essential of the right of self-determination, a proper physical basis of territory and population, is

undeniably present in the case of all the Baltic States. Everything, great or small, good or bad, right or wrong, must be measured by standards of comparison and contrast. Every little patch of land and every little handful of people can not assert independence and reasonably expect recognition from larger nations having greater geographical units and more numerous populations. But unless we are prepared to deny rights of independence to Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Montenegro, and Greece, we must grant that Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are as well qualified by the proper standard of physical comparison to be free and independent as they.

Bigness is Not Greatness.

While a certain extent of territory is necessary as an element of the right of self-determination, it should not be forgotten that neither liberty nor civilization can be gauged by acres of land or by density of population. The greatest and freest peoples of the earth, as well as the noblest civilizations of all the centuries, have lived and thrived upon small and barren tracts of land. The most gifted of all the ancient races were, perhaps, the Hebrews and the Greeks. Around the civilizations of Palestine and of Greece have circled all the other high civilizations of the world. The Hebrews were the master builders of the great spiritual temple of the human race, whose corner stone is Hebrew prophecy and whose gorgeous domes are the claims of Jesus and Mahomet to the Messiahship of God. The Greeks surpassed all mankind, ancient or modern, in the variety and grandeur of intellectual triumph, and today, among the ruins and wrecks of their genius, the modern world still wanders to contemplate, admire, and study, the pride of every master and the perfection of every model.

And yet both Hebrews and Greeks inhabited comparatively barren stretches of land, not as large nor as fertile as Lithuania; for it must be remembered that Palestine has only 13,724 square miles, a territory smaller than that of either Esthonia or Latvia.

Blood, Language and Religion.

(2) Let us now consider the second element above mentioned of the right of self-determination; that is—

Certain well-defined distinctions in blood, language, and religion that differentiate its people radically from the people of the larger nation from whom separation is sought.

This element is also very clear and well defined in the claims of all the Baltic States to rights of self-determination.

The racial and religious differences between Esthonians, Letts, and Lithuanians, on the one hand, and Russians on the other, are as radical

as those between Germans and Russians, or between Englishmen and Frenchmen.

The Esthonians are Finns in blood; the Russians are Slavs. The Esthonians are Finnish in language; the Russians are Slavic. The Esthonians are Lutheran in religion; the Russians are Orthodox Greek Catholics.

The Letts and Lithuanians are Indo-Europeans in blood and language; the Russians are Slavs. The Letts are overwhelmingly Lutheran, and the Lithuanians are overwhelmingly Roman Catholics, while the Russians are overwhelmingly Orthodox Greek Catholics.

In each of the Baltic States the language both of the Government and the people is the mother tongue, which is spoken and written by a vast majority of the population.

In short, a pure strain of Finnish blood flows through the veins of Esthonians, as an almost pure Finnish language is spoken by them, while a pure strain of Indo-European blood flows through the veins of Letts and Lithuanians, at the same time that an almost pure Indo-European language is spoken by them, proving a radical difference in blood and language between the peoples of all the Baltic States and those of Slavic Russia.

Race Prejudice.

The logic and philosophy at the foundation of this second element of the right of self-determination as a reason and requirement for separate national life are to be found in the experiences and observations of mankind, that race and religious differences breed strife among nations, resulting in bloodshed and in warfare. The reason of the principle and the cause of the trouble are found deeply imbedded in human nature and in the bias and prejudices of men. We like our "kith and kin" and are naturally disposed to regard strangers with distrust, if not with positive dislike. Deadly feuds are born of the loves and hatreds of the clans, and race prejudice and tribal impulse are the most powerful of the motives of men.

Education and Culture.

(3) I come now to discuss the third element, namely:

An educational and cultural status that justifies the privilege and the enjoyment of the right of self-determination.

This element is absolutely necessary in appealing to the nations of the earth for recognition. However extensive the territory and however numerous the people, illiterate barbarians can not reasonably expect recognition of their independence from literate and civilized races. The ability to be self-governing must be shown in order to claim self-

government, and the ability to be self-governing is impossible without a certain degree of educational and cultural development and achievement.

This third element of the right of self-government is conspicuously present in the history, life and civilization of the peoples of all the Baltic States. There is practically no illiteracy among them. The man or woman of adult years in Esthonia, Latvia, or Lithuania who can not read or write is usually a mental delinquent, a lunatic, or an idiot.

The extraordinarily high rate of literacy in the Baltic countries is really astonishing when we consider that just across the border in Russia the population is 70 per cent illiterate, by conservative estimate, and is placed by many writers as high as 80 per cent.

University Education.

In university as well as in common-school education the populations of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are remarkably advanced. The following comparative statistics in university education are illustrative. The university students of Latvia in 1913, the year before the war, were by comparison as follows:

University Students	
Latvia	1,950
Denmark	1,460
Norway	1,400
Sweden	1,200
Portugal	1,150

It will thus be seen that although her population is smaller than that of either Denmark, Sweden, or Portugal, the number of university students of Latvia is numerically greater, and what is true of Latvia in university education is equally true of Esthonia and Lithuania.

Personal Observation.

I beg you to pardon me for personal reference to myself and to what I have recently done and seen and heard in this connection. In the summer of 1919 and again in January, February, and March of this year I visited all the Baltic countries and traveled extensively through them by train and automobile. I was astonished at the high-grade civilization of the masses of the people and at the fine accomplishments and brilliant educations of the public men with whom I met. At Reval, at Kovno, and at Riga, the capitals, respectively, of Esthonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, I was honored by being the invited guest at public dinners given by ministers of state. I was surprised and pleased to learn that all of these statesmen were university graduates and that most of them spoke several languages, including English, fluently.

Culture Among Peasants.

Any doubt as to the educational qualifications of all the Baltic Republics for self-determination and independence will be removed by a short visit to these countries. The visitor will find peasant populations with books, periodicals, magazines, and musical instruments in the home, and, to his amazement, he will find that a considerable percentage of the people of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania speak three languages—German, Russian, and their mother tongue—and that they are somewhat familiar with the history and literature of the countries of these languages.

Of all the elements that form a just basis of claims to rights of self-government and independence among the Baltic peoples, the test of literacy is the greatest, for the thirst of Esthonians, Letts, and Lithuanians for knowledge and education is as unquenchable as their thirst for freedom is unconquerable.

Russian Oppression of Baltic Peoples.

(4) Permit me, if you please, at this time to discuss the fourth element of the right of self-determination above mentioned, namely:

Governmental oppression, extending over decades or centuries, exercised by a larger over a smaller nation, rendering self-determination by the smaller nation a supreme necessity.

It seems quite unnecessary to discuss this element or phase of the subject at any length. All men are thoroughly familiar with the history of Russian cruelty and oppression. Scholars of every nation know well the details of Russian tyranny and persecution. Siberian dungeons have been the horror and the nightmare of Russian freedom in every age. Not only nihilists and anarchists, who deserved incarceration, but patriots and freemen who thirsted and fought for liberty spent wretched lives and met horrible deaths within them.

A Policy of Tyranny.

Russian history is replete with instances of governmental cruelty and oppression. Russian imperial administrative affairs were simply records of revolting and horrible stifling of man's natural cravings and struggles for freedom. Other nations—Greece, Rome, Spain, France, and England—have had periods of despotic sway. Russia has been uniformly the land of barbarism and illiteracy, of tyranny and oppression. This tyranny and oppression have been dealt out not only to Letts, Esthonians, and Lithuanians but to the Russians themselves. Slavs as well as Finns and Indo-Europeans have been the barbarized and persecuted victims of the Russian imperial system of government. The

fixed and unalterable policy of that Government was to hold in ignorance and abject slavery the masses of the Russian population, trusting to this method of government to destroy the aspirations for freedom that are natural to men.

Soviet Rule.

When we turn from the régime of the Czar to the rule of the soviet, we find neither hope nor consolation. We have simply passed from one gloomy prison dungeon to another. Both are monumental, pyramidal tyrannies, and of the two the reign of Nicholas would be preferable to the rule of Lenin and Trotski, for the absolutism of an aristocracy is better than the despotism of the proletariat.

In other words and in short, Esthonians, Letts, and Lithuanians can not and will not consent to enter into political union with Russians under any known form of Russian government that history presents.

Russian "Unity."

Russian tyranny and oppression was born of the design and determination of the Russian clergy and Government to reduce to one homogeneous whole the heterogeneous masses and nationalities of the various peoples and races of the Russian Empire. One Czar, one Orthodox Catholic faith, one Russian language was the slogan of all the Russian priests and statesmen, and from this policy of amalgamation proceeded centuries of discrimination, persecution, and mean oppression. The idea of one Czar caused the attempt to suppress tribal impulse and the aspirations of distinct races for self-government and independence. The idea of one Orthodox Catholic faith caused religious persecution out of which came the most bitter of all revolt. The idea of one Russian language caused the attempt to suppress the mother tongues of the Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, and other non-Russian nationalities, and this in every age has been a mean form of persecution, for the love of the mother tongue is second only to the love of the mother herself or to that of God and country.

Suppression of Languages.

A peculiar form of Russian malignity and persecution, in the matter of attempted suppression of language, took place in the year 1864, when Muravjev prohibited the publication of anything in the Lithuanian language and in Latin characters. The compulsory use of Russian lettering in the publication of books and papers in Lithuania was intended to destroy gradually all knowledge of the mother tongue of Lithuanians.

When the Letts demanded judges with a knowledge of their own

language the Russians replied by forbidding such judges to use the Lettish language.

When Esthonians and Letts demanded a voice in the solution of the agrarian problem in accordance with modern notions of right and justice, the Russians replied by extending sympathy and aid to the German Baltic barons, and, to aggravate the matter, brought Russian colonists from the interior of Russia to colonize Esthonia and Latvia.

Innumerable forms of Russian tyranny and oppression might be mentioned, but it is considered that sufficient has been said as a matter of illustration.

Up to this moment I have discussed the subject of the recognition of the independence of the Baltic peoples from the viewpoint of certain cardinal elements of the right of self-government; that is, extent of territory and population, race and religious differences, educational status, and long-continued oppression.

Economic Bases of Baltic States.

I come now to discuss the economic, industrial, and agricultural life of these countries as a secondary, but nevertheless very essential, element of the claim to recognition of independence by the nations of the world. Indeed, this element is given primary consideration by many writers upon the subject of the justice and advisability of recognizing the independent national existence of the newly created non-Russian republics of the former Russian Empire. It is contended by some of these writers that Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania are too weak and undeveloped economically, industrially, and agriculturally to maintain separate and independent stations among the nations of the earth. It is further asserted by them that to recognize the independence of these little States would be to create permanently dependent communities whose helplessness would make them perpetual wards of the larger nations. This is the chief contention of the advocates of a reunited and federated Russia.

Facts and figures, however, and especially comparative statistics, negative completely the idea that these countries are not fitted economically for separate and independent life. It can be easily shown that other nations less strong and well developed economically, commercially, and agriculturally have maintained centuries of separate national existence. Unfortunately, however, the time allotted to me does not permit an elaboration of argument from statistics. I have time to suggest only one illustration of the economic strength of the Baltic countries.

Revenues in 1913.

I respectfully submit on this point that the revenue-producing powers of a country, under normal conditions of equitable taxation, give a most satisfactory idea of the economic strength of that country.

In 1913, the year before the outbreak of the war, when conditions were normal, Esthonia, the smallest and poorest of the Baltic Republics, paid 50,000,000 rubles into the Russian treasury. This money paid all the expenses of her local government and left a balance, a net deposit of 5,000,000 rubles for the benefit of some other Provinces of the Russian Empire that showed a deficit. Esthonia being the smallest and poorest, this fact alone is proof of the economic abilities of all the non-Russian Republics to be self-sustaining under an independent régime.

Nevertheless, it may be mentioned as additional proof that Latvia, in 1913, produced 88,054,576 rubles revenue; that the grand total of her local provincial expenses in that year were 54,324,205 rubles, leaving a net revenue amounting to 33,730,371 rubles to be sent to the Imperial Russian treasury.

Lithuania's Revenues.

As still further illustration and proof, permit me to say that in the same year, 1913, Lithuania raised a national or, rather, provincial revenue of 55,000,000 rubles, and spent some 20,000,000 rubles in her local government, according to a statement furnished me by Mr. J. Vileisis, former minister of finance of the Republic of Lithuania. It will thus be seen that Lithuania sent, in the year preceding the war, 35,000,000 rubles as a contribution to the Imperial Russian treasury to help pay the expenses of less-favored portions of the Empire.

I respectfully submit that these facts and figures furnish indubitable proof that these little countries could each maintain the government of an independent republic at home and sustain all necessary diplomatic offices abroad.

Objections Answered.

The contentions therefore made in behalf of the independence of the little republics have been affirmative. Certain negative considerations or objections should be noted at this time.

Inexperience in Government.

In the first place, it is contended that the peoples of these non-Russian republics are not fitted for self-government because they have had no experience; because it would be like sending out little children into the world without training and guidance. This is worse than foolish,

for it flies completely in the face of the history and the essential conditions of the lives of nations and of men. No great nation of this earth ever began national existence with finished experience. The history of mankind shows no graduate or postgraduate nations from birth. Each and all have been compelled to tread the bitter pathway of suffering, self-development, self-denial, and individual experiment. Every great man of eminence of the earth of any calling or profession has had to have his beginning and his individual experience.

The American Colonies.

At the time of the American Revolution it was contended by the enemies of America in England that the colonists were not fitted for self-government. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, defended them most brilliantly in Parliament against this charge. With superb eloquence he declared that he had studied the political masterpieces of antiquity and of modern times and that he had never read finer productions of statesmanship than had been sent overseas from America to England by the inexperienced colonial statesmen—Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton. And yet today we have what Americans believe to be the greatest and mightiest of all Republics of the earth, and when we Americans make speeches in Congress we support our arguments by citations from the words and deeds of these inexperienced colonial master builders of the early Republic.

Statesmen of Baltic Republics.

As a matter of fact, however, it can not be truthfully contended that the statesmen of these little countries have not had considerable experience and have not demonstrated the finest qualities of statesmanship under the most trying circumstances. About three years have elapsed since they separately declared their independence. During that time they have adopted constitutions, organized stable governments, with cabinets of ministers, and with national assemblies. They have organized and outfitted splendid young armies that have already given a fine account of themselves upon the battlefield. The deliberations and official conduct of their ministers have been marked in all things by ability and conservatism. Their national assemblies have acted with wisdom in most cases and have as yet enacted no foolish or extremely radical legislation. Civil and religious liberty and the sacred rights of private property are everywhere to be found in the provisions of their constitutions and in the enactments of their national parliaments.

Personal Recollections.

It is now and will always be a matter of pride and pleasure that I have met and known the leading statesmen of the Baltic Republics. Many of them I met at Paris in the summer of 1919 during the sessions of the peace conference. Others I met in the capitals of their countries. All of them are, without exception, brainy and accomplished men, and I never talked to one of them that I did not think of the remark of one of the European diplomats, referring to Venizelos, of Greece, that the small nations of Europe had furnished to the conference at Paris its greatest statesmen.

Esthonian Leaders.

At Paris I met Antoine Piip, present minister of foreign affairs of Esthonia, a young, grave, serious, and accomplished man, who was formerly professor of international law at the University of Petrograd.

Afterwards, at Reval, I met Konstantin Pätz, who is now president of the constituent assembly and virtual head of the Republic of Esthonia. Pätz is a writer and lawyer of distinction, who has translated the Constitution of the United States into the Esthonian language for the benefit of his countrymen. His life's history has a deep touch and coloring of the high heroic and of martyrdom, for he spent many months in prison and was once condemned to death for his supreme devotion to the cause of the liberty and independence of his country. While at Reval I met other able ministers of state of Esthonia, among them Otto Strandman, prime minister, and Gen. Laidoner, minister of war.

Lithuanians.

At Kovno, the temporary capital of Lithuania, I had the pleasure of meeting Stulginskis, president of the constituent assembly and the recognized head of the Republic of Lithuania. One of my most pleasant and interesting experiences in Europe was to listen to Stulginskis address the national assembly on the occasion of the celebration of the third anniversary of Lithuanian independence. At Kovno I also met Grinius, prime minister, and Purickis, minister of foreign affairs, of Lithuania. Purickis is a Roman Catholic priest of great learning and piety and intensely devoted to his country.

Latvians.

At Riga it was my great pleasure and privilege to meet the leading Latvian statesmen. I met Tschakste, president of the constituent assembly and titular chief of the Latvian State, a venerable and accomplished man, whose great good nature and merry twinkle of the eye

endear him to all who know him. I also met Meierovics, minister of foreign affairs of Latvia, a youth in years but a veteran in statesmanship and diplomacy, a man of fine accomplishments and wonderfully pleasing personality. It was my good fortune, also, to meet Ulmanis, prime minister of Latvia, a big, brave, brainy man, a rugged patriot who loves Latvia as Macaulay says Pitt loved England, as an Athenian loved Athens, as a Roman loved the city of Seven Hills.

Builders of New Governments.

All these men are university graduates and have had wide political experience under the Imperial Government of Russia and later as founders and builders of their own Republics. And I want to assure you that I have little patience with the views of those who contend that such men are inexperienced and incompetent, and that the destinies of the Baltic Republics are not safe in their hands. I wish, further, to say that it would be decidedly ungenerous to judge these statesmen of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, or their early Governments, by the records of a few short years immediately following a great and paralyzing war, and without any recognition of their independence whatever from the nations of the earth. It would be just as generous to chain a man hand and foot and then command him to run and condemn him because he could not.

Russia Can Not Govern Baltic States.

In this connection it may be well to observe that the strange and absurd proposition is advanced that the non-Russian Republics are not capable of governing themselves but that Russia is capable of governing them. A moment's reflection will demonstrate the fallacy and the absurdity of this contention. Russia is worse than a broken reed. The poor old Russian ship of state is a mass of wreckage swept by every storm and tossed ruthlessly by every wave. On the other hand, the little Republics have stable Governments, organized along constitutional lines of right and freedom, and sustained by well-disciplined armies that have beaten back bolshevism from their territories and that stand today as breakwaters against a great tide of anarchy and ignorance. Can it be seriously contended that these little well-ordered States can not govern themselves, but that Russia can govern them?

The Russian Problem.

Of course, it is nothing but fair to state that the advocates of a greater Russia contend that a stable government can be established out of the ruins of the present Russia, and that it might be well to leave

Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as political units or national members of this greater Russia. Such a proposition is neither fair, feasible, nor just. Neither the wisdom of the philosopher nor the vision of the prophet can tell what will be the result of government in Russia in the next generation or century. The return of the Czar and of absolutism is unthinkable, and is seriously contemplated by nobody except the interested Russian aristocracy. But whether a constitutional monarchy, a federative republic, or several independent republics, for the territory of the ancient Russian Empire, is a question for debate. Each has its advocates, and one of them must be a solution of the Russian problem.

A Constitutional Monarchy?

A constitutional monarchy is not practicable or advisable for Russia. The history of England shows that years and generations were required to determine whether a given race of people, endowed with certain national and individual attributes, are capable of self-government under a liberal monarchy. The first Englishmen of more than a thousand years ago were probably more intelligent and conservative and adapted to self-government than are the Russians of today, and yet it took all these years of painful development, with all the strange vicissitudes of British history, such as the contest of the Barons with King John over Magna Charta, the beheading of King Charles, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Cromwell, to bring England to her present proud station as the leading monarchial democratic Commonwealth of the world.

A Federative Republic?

A federative republic is out of the question, as a conference of Russians at Petrograd, under the Kerensky régime, admitted. A republic of any kind, to be worthy of the name, must of necessity rest upon the will of the people and be controlled by the action of the majority. Russia proper has 130,000,000 of the 180,000,000 people of the former Russian Empire. This vast majority is densely illiterate and can not justly rule the intelligent, literate non-Russian minority. If England, France, the United States, or some other masterful and intelligent nation could be placed where great Russia is, a federative republic might be possible, since the dominating race would then form the intelligent head of a confederacy of peoples of different races and religions. The United States, Great Britain, and France illustrate this truth in their governments today. But it is inconceivable to think that great Russia could govern a federative republic where the non-Russian members of the confederation would form the only intelligent and educated elements.

The Russians ruled the empire of the Czar on principles and under terms of absolutism, and not upon the principles of freedom and democracy, such as the existence of a republic necessarily implies.

American Federation.

Besides, our American experiment throws serious doubt upon the advisability of a federative republic for Russia. In America, after seven years and eight months of bitter struggle, we gained our independence; but from the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown to the adoption of our Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787 was a period of six years, and then it required more than half a century, until the close of our Civil War in 1865, to determine whether free government under a federative republic in America were possible. And I respectfully submit that Americans in every age, besides being homogeneous in race, language, and religion, and contiguous in territory, have been more intelligent, conservative and literate than are the Russians of today.

When Will Russia Come Back?

To suppose that Russia can develop in a generation a stable form of government is to fly in the face of the facts and teachings of history. The illiteracy and the emotional and idealistic tendencies of the Russian mind will make Russians for many years to come a buffet and a prey of every fanatic like Lenin and every demagogue like Trotsky that may come along.

Baltic States Should be Recognized.

Should the rights of the intelligent, well-organized, non-Russian Republics to self-determination and independence be made contingent upon the speculative proposition of the establishment of a stable government in Russia any time within the next few years? I think not. Justice requires that these little countries be immediately recognized and admitted to the League of Nations or otherwise protected by an alliance of nations, with the understanding that they are to perform all their obligations under the league or alliance, including the maintenance of friendly relations with all mankind, and especially with their immediate surrounding neighbors, and that they shall then have the protection of the league or alliance of nations against the aggressors of all mankind, particularly against Germany and Russia.

The Baltic Land Question.

The Baltic baron land question is acute, and in the minds of many forms a serious objection in connection with the consideration of the question of the recognition of the independence of Esthonia and Latvia. Some 700 years ago Germans invaded Esthonia and Latvia, conquered the land by force of arms, and made serfs of the people, as William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066 and made serfs and churls of the Saxons. The Esthonians and Letts have never ceased to hope that they would some day regain their freedom and their lands. The defeat of Germany and the destruction of the Empire of the Czar removed from Europe and from history the two great oppressors of Esthonians and Letts. Since the establishment of the Esthonian and Lettish Republics, several Esthonian and Lettish statesmen, as well as certain statesmen in other European countries, have contended that these lands that were virtually stolen from their countrymen by highway robbers 700 years ago should now be taken back by confiscation, since no legal title was ever vested in the usurpers upon these lands. But it seems that a different course is now being pursued by the Esthonian and Lettish national assemblies, out of respect to the opinions and wishes of America and of the Allies, and that some form of compensation will be given to the Baltic barons for their lands, leaving to them a portion of the lands also, regardless of the methods by which they were acquired in the beginning. I have just been informed by Mr. Louis Seya, representative of Latvia, who has just arrived in America, that this is the attitude of his Government at the present time.

An Internal Question.

The settlement of this problem, however, should not be final or decisive in the matter of the determination of the rights of Esthonia and Latvia. The disposition of this question is really an internal affair, and if our Government can not intervene in Russia to protect the land of the Russian nobility against confiscation by Trotski and Lenin, if it is not regarded as worth while to object to the confiscation of the lands and properties of the Austrian nobility by the Czecho-Slovaks, and having as an example the practical confiscation of church properties in France not many years ago, against which no civilized nation protested at the time, I respectfully submit that the little Republics of Esthonia and Latvia should not be made a special example in this regard.

These little States have met every possible objection to their claims to independence. They agree to pay their proportionate share of the Russian prewar debt, to allow neutral countries, or the League of Nations, in conference with their own representatives, to determine the amount,

and to pledge their natural resources and future revenues for the payment.

The Baltic Ports.

The advocates of a reunited Russia insist that the independence of Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania would practically shut out Great Russia from the Baltic Sea and from free commerce with the western world. These gentlemen contend that the absolute independence of these States, considering their small territory and geographical location, would be a constant menace to the peace of the world, because of the supreme necessities of Russian industrial and commercial life, and that their reconquest by some Charles XII or Peter the Great would be only a matter of time and provocation and circumstance in history.

The answer to this objection is that the Baltic States have all repeatedly proposed to the peace conference at Paris, and at other times to the representatives of different nations, to keep their ports on the Baltic open to the Russians under fair and equitable conditions of port duties and customs charges; also to guarantee to the Russians equitable railway transit across their territories, thus furnishing fair and unobstructed passage from Russia to the open sea. In the various treaties they have made with soviet Russia they have already acted and are now acting in good faith in the proposals they have made in this regard.

Dismemberment of Russia.

Again, certain objectors to the independence of the Baltic States have urged that legally, under international law, the allied nations can not recognize them as independent governments. It is contended that the doctrine of self-determination was and is intended to apply only to the enemy countries, namely, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and that the application of the principle to former Russian Provinces would be a virtual dismemberment of the territory of a friendly country.

The first reply to this contention is that Russia has never been in any proper sense a friendly country since the last days of the Kerensky régime.

In the second place, reply should be made that the principle of self-determination, if just and righteous in any case, should be applied in all cases where the elements forming the necessary basis of self-determination are present. Certainly a just and righteous principle of government should not be employed as an instrument of punishment or revenge by being applied alone to enemy countries. It is ironically cruel to deny to friends the benefits that enemies enjoy.

Dismemberment an Accomplished Fact.

In the third place, it may be replied that Russia has already been dismembered by both Russians and the Allies. In the Brest-Litovsk treaty the bolshevik rulers of Russia practically ceded all the Baltic Provinces to Germany, and subsequently by complementary agreements at Berlin in the summer of 1918 completed the cession by waiving all rights of sovereignty of any kind over these western Russian States. The fact that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk has since been repudiated by the Allies and has been canceled by Germany does not alter the fact that Russia was dismembered by Russians themselves.

Finland, Poland, Armenia.

Again, in the acknowledgement of the independence of Finland, the Allies themselves have particularly dismembered Russia. This dismemberment was further carried out by the acknowledgement of the independence of Russian Poland,Russian Armenia, and by the separation and cession of Bessarabia. The contention has been made that these were exceptions and were not intended as precedents, but the fact of dismemberment remains nevertheless, and the precedents are there regardless of the intention.

Treaties With Russia.

The various recent treaties between the soviet government and the Governments of the Baltic Republics by which the bolsheviki have formally and solemnly acknowledged the independence of the little countries is the best possible proof of the willingness of the bolsheviki to dismember Russia. And not only the Russians under Lenin and Trotski but Russians who are not bolsheviki have also consented. I personally saw Gen. Yudenitch, commander of the Russian Army on the north-western front, sign an agreement to acknowledge the independence of Esthonia. Conditions were attached, however, to the agreement which rendered it impossible for the Esthonians to accept. Nevertheless, the fact of the willingness of the leader of one of the non-bolshevik Russian armies to acknowledge the independence of Esthonia and thereby dismember the Russian Empire remains.

Supreme Council's Action.

Permit me to say, in conclusion, if you please, that all discussion of the dismemberment of Russia in the future will be worse than idle talk. The Russian Empire has been recently definitely and irrevocably dismembered by the allied powers at Paris when they acknowledged

the independence *de jure* of Esthonia and Latvia, and intimated that they would acknowledge the independence *de jure* of Lithuania as soon as the Polish frontier question had been settled. The brave little Republics of the Baltic Sea are now free and independent States and members in good standing of the great family of nations. Their sovereignty has been established and decreed by all the great Governments of the world excepting our own. The recognition of their independence was *de jure,* not *de facto*—absolute, not conditional—and they will remain forever free until they waive and surrender their sovereignty by treaty stipulations or until they are overrun by some conqueror who robs them of their freedom. Neither one of these contingencies is to be thought of at this time.

I am well aware that the Government of the United States is not necessarily bound by the action of other Governments in this regard. But I respectfully suggest that a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, a proper spirit of international comity, and a due appreciation of the action of other Governments, should impel us to follow immediately the example of other nations and to recognize at once the independence absolute of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Briand's Recognition of Latvia.

When Aristide Briand sent official notification of the recognition of Latvia to the president of the Latvian delegation at Paris he used this language:

> "The supreme council of the allied powers, taking into consideration the repeated requests presented by your Government, has decided at its session of today to recognize Latvia as a *de jure* State.
>
> "The powers desire to mark by this the sympathy which they feel toward the Latvian people and to render homage to what it has accomplished in the establishment of order and peace in its national life."

The suggestion of the "establishment of order and peace" as the reason of the recognition of the independence of Latvia is full of meaning and is a direct and powerful appeal to us for our official recognition. With the fall of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the soviet government a supreme crisis confronted Latvia and the other Baltic States. The alternative of following Russia into bolshevism and anarchy or of standing with the civilized nations of the world for the maintenance of law and order presented itself. There was no hesitation in deciding.

Baltic States Fought Bolsheviki.

The brave little Republics at once scornfully and defiantly repudiated Lenin and Trotski and all their teachings and practices, and allied themselves with the antibolshevik peoples of the earth. And from the very first there has been no change of resolution, no wavering, no retreat. Bravely, steadfastly, and with sublime purpose and resolve they have borne the brunt of battle against the hordes of anarchy in Russia. While university professors throughout the world were learnedly discussing bolshevik theories in the quiet and seclusion of academic shades, and while statesmen of Rome, Paris, London, and Washington have been loudly denouncing Lenin and Trotski from afar, the brave soldiers of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been engaged in a death struggle at close quarters with the Red armies of Russia.

Do these sufferings and sacrifices deserve no recognition, no reward? Is it without meaning that men and women and children should starve and wear rags and die for others? Men and women and children have starved and worn rags and died rather than accept bolshevik favors or submit to bolshevik rule.

Esthonian Soldiers.

In the summer of 1919 I visited Esthonia. Through Gen. Toennison, their commander, as interpreter, I addressed the various units of the Esthonian Army. While I was speaking the soldiers were standing at rigid salute. Many of them were boys not more than 15 years of age. Though young in years, their sufferings and sacrifices had given them faces and features that looked bronzed and granite like. From each eye a glint of desperation and defiance gleamed fiercely when they looked across their barbed-wire entanglements toward the bolshevik battle line a few miles away. Most of these brave fellows were poorly clad and barefooted. I assured them that the greatest Republic in the world, my own country, had been founded by barefooted soldiers who left blood prints upon the snows at Valley Forge. I told them that I saw in them the resurrected, the reincarnated soldiers of Valley Forge, and that I would never cease pleading their cause until their country was as free and independent as mine. And I am here today to fulfill that pledge, not only to Esthonians but to others as well, to Letts and Lithuanians who are equally brave and self-sacrificing as Esthonians.

Recognition is a Duty.

I respectfully submit that a sacred and solemn duty rests upon the United States to recognize at once the independence *de jure* of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They merit our recognition and our good will,

our sympathy, and our support. They merit the recognition and good will and sympathy and support of all civilized mankind.

Their people are literate, their statesmen are able and accomplished, and their soldiers are brave and unconquerable. These are the real attributes of sovereignty and the right to be free and independent, for, after all, the permanency and prosperity of nations depend upon the wisdom of the statesmen who conceive the constitution and create the laws, upon the patriotism and intelligence of the people who make and support the government, and upon the courage of soldiers who defend the national frontiers. All these things are pre-eminently present in the life, character, history, and civilization of the Baltic Republics of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the recognition of whose independence as free and independent States I advocate today.